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TAXING INTERNATIONAL INCOME:
INADEQUATE PRINCIPLES, OUTDATED
CONCEPTS, AND UNSATISFACTORY
POLICIES
Michael J. Graetz*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure to be here today to deliver the first David
R. Tillinghast Lecture of the 21st century,' :a lecture honoring
a man who has done much to shape' and stimulate our think-
ing about the international tax world of the 20th.
Our nation's system for taxing international income today
is largely a creature of the period 1918-1928; a time when the
income tax was itself in childhood.2 From the inception of the
income tax (1913 for individuals, 1909 for corporations) until
1918, foreign taxes were deducted like any other business
xpense. In 1918, the foreign tax credit (FTC) was enacted.4
This unilateral decision by the United States to allow taxes
paid abroad to reduce U.S. tax liability dollar for dollar-taken
principally to redress the unfairness of "double taxation" of
* Delivered at New York University School of Law, October 26, 2000. © Tax
Law Review. Originally published in 54 TAX L. REV. _ (2001). Reprinted by per-
mission.
1. Or, in my obviously minority view, the last Tillinghast Lecture of the 20th
century.
2. For description and analysis of this formative period of U.S. international
income tax policy, see Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original
Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1022-28 (1997).
3. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114; Corporation
Excise Tax Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17. The
reasoning behind the international tax aspects of the 1913 Act is difficult to dis-
cern from the historical sources. Some scholars have concluded that "it is quite
likely that Congress gave little or no thought to the effect of the Revenue Act of
1913 on the foreign income of U.S. persons or the U.S. income of foreign persons."
Alan G. Choate, Steven Hurok & Samuel E. Klein, Federal Tax Policy for Foreign
Income and Foreign Taxpayers-History, Analysis and Prospects, 44 TEMPLE L.Q.
441, 481 (1971). The decision in 1913 to tax the worldwide income of taxpayers
simply may have followed the earlier decision to tax worldwide income in the 1909
federal excise tax on corporate income. Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, Pub.
L. No. 61-5, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17.
4. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-245, ch. 18, § 238(a), 40 Stat. 1057,
1080-81 (1919).
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foreign source income-was extraordinarily generous to those
nations where U.S. companies earned income. In contrast,
Britain, also a large capital exporter, until the 1940's credited
only foreign taxes paid within the British Empire and limited
its credit to a maximum of one-half the British taxes on the
foreign income.5
In 1921, Congress limited the foreign tax credit to ensure
that a taxpayer's total foreign tax credits could not exceed the
amount of U.S. tax liability on the taxpayer's foreign source
income.6 This limitation was enacted to prevent taxes from
countries with higher rates from reducing U.S. tax liability on
U.S. source income.7
In 1928, the League of Nations issued drafts of model
bilateral income tax treaties for the reciprocal relief of double
taxation of international income.8 These models, as modified
from time to time, have served as the common basis for more
than 1700 bilateral income tax treaties now in force through-
out the world? The system for taxing international income
produced in that decade-often referred to in the literature as
the 1920's compromise °--is routinely characterized as allo-
cating the taxation of business income to the country of its
source and the taxation of portfolio income to the country of
the capital supplier's residence.
Nothing comparable to the thoroughgoing multilateral
restructurings of international monetary and trade relation-
ships that followed the Second World War (which themselves
have been substantially revised and refined since) has affected
the system of international income taxation." It is remark-
5. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1045-48.
6. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, § 222(a)(5), 42 Stat. 227,
249.
7. Internal Revenue: Hearing on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 67th Cong., 74 (1921) (statement of T.S. Adams), reprinted in 95A Inter-
nal Revenue Act of the United States 1909-1950: Legislative Histories, Laws, and
Administrative Documents (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) [hereinafter Adams
Statement]; Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1054-56.
8. Id. at 1066-89.
9. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
1998: Trends and Determinants xix (1998) [hereinafter UN Report].
10. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1026.
11. Professor Richard Vann of Australia has described this circumstance as
follows:
Although it is possible to refine the actual terms of the OECD Model
and to elaborate the commentary so as to cover new cases as they arise,
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able that not only the fundamental structure of the system for
taxing international income today, but also many of the core
concepts used to implement that structure-concepts such as
permanent establishment, corporate residence, and arm's
length pricing-date from a time when airplanes were first
becoming a regular means of travel, and when the "wireless"
was a relatively new instrument of communication, and when
Dorothy Parker, Robert Benchley, and Haywood Broun were
holding court in the lobby of the Algonquin Hotel, a mile away.
The rules for taxing international income put in place
following the First World War, however, have been tweaked
from time to time, usually in response to one perceived abuse
or another. This audience requires no litany of these occasions,
but, to avoid misunderstandings, let me name a few: the for-
eign personal holding company rules, added in the 1930's,12
Subpart F, enacted in the 1960's,13 the earnings stripping
rules and PFIC regime added in the 1980's,"4 the various
methods for allocating deductions between domestic and for-
eign source income adopted in 1977"s and revised substantial-
ly since, and most recently, refinements in the methods for
determining, verifying, and enforcing related-company transfer
prices."
Likewise, the method for determining the limitation on
foreign tax credits has taken a variety of forms over the years,
having been computed based on a taxpayer's overall foreign
source income when first enacted in 1921,17 limited to the
the time has passed for radical revision within the current bilateral
framework. In a sense the opportunity to go in another direction was lost
before the 1963 draft appeared. The failure to adopt any new approach
to international tax after the Second World War (compared to trade law
and the international monetary system) meant that effectively the solu-
tion adopted after the First World War continued by default. In other
words the OECD Model is the culmination of 50 years of development,
rather than a new departure.
Richard J. Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region? (pt. 1), 45
BULL. INT'L Fisc. Doc. 99, 103 (1991).
12. Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, § 201, 50 Stat. 813.
13. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
14. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7210(a), 103
Stat. 2106, 2339.
15. Tax Reduction & Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat.
126.
16. Reg. § 1.482-1 to-8.
17. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, § 222(a)(5), 42 Stat. 227,
20011 1359
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lesser of an overall or per-country amount in the 1930's,
1940's, and early 1950's,"8 and computed country by country
in the latter half of the 1950's.' 9 Beginning in 1960, taxpayers
were given the option of an overall or per country limitation"
until 1976 when the per country limitation2' was repealed
and the law returned to its 1921 shape." There it rested until
1986 when today's system, which categorizes various types of
income into so-called baskets for purposes of calculating the
foreign tax limitation, came into effect.' Whenever the limita-
tion has changed, Congress has expressed concern with pro-
tecting the U.S. tax on U.S. source income from erosion.'
Each time the law has changed, it has introduced new
challenges for tax compliance and administration. Thus, al-
though the fundamental structure of international income
taxation devised in the 1920's remains in force, the legal rules
detailing the implementation of that structure today comprise
a cumbersome creation of stupefying complexity. Moreover,
whenever this or some other first-world nation struggles to
keep its income tax law intact by responding to new ways of
doing business, for example, electronic commerce, innovations
in financial practices or instruments, or novel business combi-
nations and linkages, the new domestic law often produces
aftershocks abroad. The use of the check-the-box rules for
entity classification by hybrid foreign entities may serve as
Exhibit I for this point.'
Along with its complexity, the importance of the regime for
taxing international income has also increased dramatically
since the 1920's, even since it was last reexamined in the
249.
18. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 32-154, ch. 109, § 131(b), 47 Stat. 169,
211.
19. Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, ch. 736, § 904, 68A
Stat. 3, 287-88.
20. Act of Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-280, § 1(a), 74 Stat. 1010, 1010.
21. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1031, 90 Stat. 1610, 1620-
24 (codified as amended at IRC § 904).
22. Id.; Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1056 n.141.
23. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1201, 100 Stat. 2085, 2520-
28 (codified as amended at IRC § 904(d)). For a more detailed description of this
history, see Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1056 n.141.
24. See text accompanying note 149 (statement of T.S. Adams).
25. The check-the-box regulations allow many entities to elect whether to be
treated as corporations or partnerships or to be disregarded as a branch. See Reg.
§ 301.7701-1 to -3. The box is checked on Form 8832.
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1980's. And the United States, which for most of the century
could be viewed simply as a capital-exporting nation, is now
both a large capital importer and exporter. Indeed, just looking
at its net position, the United States has changed from being
the world's largest creditor to being one of its largest debtor
nations."'
Two major developments should be emphasized. First, the
gross flows of capital both from the United States abroad and
from the rest of the world into the United States are very large
and increasingly important to the U.S. economy. Second, the
growth in cross-border portfolio investments has been stunning
in recent years.
Thus, although the founders of the system for taxing inter-
national income confronted only one important issue, the taxa-
tion of foreign direct investments by U.S. multinationals,
policymakers today must address the taxation of large inbound
and outbound flows of both direct and portfolio investment.
Moreover, just looking at the incoming and outgoing flows of
direct investment in the figures above, it is clear that, for cor-
porations at least, tax considerations play a significant role.
Luxemborg, for example, supplies almost as much direct in-
vestment to the United States as France and Canada, and the
size of direct investment from the United States to Bermuda
and Panama surely is not justified by economic considerations
alone. The important role played by tax considerations in busi-
ness activities is not surprising, and is confirmed by more
sophisticated empirical analyses.27 Looking at portfolio in-
vestment, on the other hand, seems to suggest that the flow of
dollars is being driven by the underlying economics.'
26. The United States recently had been the world's largest debtor nation
until June, 2000, when Japan took over first place, relegating the U.S. to second.
See Japan Largest Debtor Nation, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, June 24, 2000 at 8.
27. See, e.g., Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Has U.S.
Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates?, NBER WORKING PAPER
No. 6383, 1998, available at http'//papers.nber.org/papersfW6383; Rosanne Altshuler
& T. Scott Newlon, The Effect of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Repatriation Pat-
tern of U.S. Multinational Corporations, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
77-115 (Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard & Joel Slemrod eds., 1993); Harry
Grubert, Taxes and the Division of Foreign Operating Income among Royalties,
Interest, Dividends and Retained Earnings, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 269-90 (1998); James
R. Hines, Jr., Lessons From Behavioral Responses to International Taxation, 52
NAT'L TAX J. 305-22 (1999).
28. See Figure 3.
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Despite the age of the international income tax regime and
the dramatic economic changes since it was put in place, Con-
gress has shown little interest in ideas for fundamental re-
structuring or even review of the basic international income
tax arrangements. Instead, the international income tax sys-
tem lurches from one perceived threat to another: transfer
pricing abuses yesterday, "harmful" tax competition and under-
reporting of portfolio capital income today, and who knows
what tomorrow. Despite the obvious strain, the wheels do not
seem to be coming off, at least not yet. In fact, the internation-
al income tax system has served reasonably well; it has not
proven a significant barrier to the international flows of goods,
services, labor, or capital, and may even have facilitated such
flows. This no doubt is why it has survived intact for so long.
Nevertheless, this is a propitious time for a fundamental
reexamination of the system of international income taxation
and the principles and concepts on which it is based. Recent
changes in the world economy-the unprecedented movement
of goods and services and of labor and capital throughout the
world, the innovations in financial instruments and business
combinations, the economic and political unification of Europe,
the emergence of capitalism in the former Soviet Union and
eastern Europe and of China as a major economic force, the
advent of electronic commerce, and ongoing integration of the
world's economy-demand a thoroughgoing review. Such a
reexamination may conclude that today's international tax
regime is the best we can do, or it may reveal opportunities for
major improvements.
But we-and here by we, I mean the professional interna-
tional tax community-lawyers, accountants, and economists,
in the universities, private practice, and the government-are
not well-positioned to conduct such a comprehensive review.
We have been blinded by adherence to inadequate principles
and remain wedded to outdated concepts. As a result, we have
no sound basis for pronouncing our international tax policy
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. Fashioning proper policy re-
quires clear and appropriate normative bearings. Even then, it
is a daunting task.
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II. INADEQUATE PRINCIPLES
Discussions of the principles and goals motivating interna-
tional income tax policy are perplexing to the nonspecialist.
Often description of foundational principles is omitted altogeth-
er; many authors simply assume that the normative basis for
international income tax rules is widely understood and enjoys
universal agreement. One common shorthand, especially preva-
lent in the legal literature, is to begin by announcing accep-
tance of the "1920's international tax compromise" and then
proceeding to describe how a modern transaction or problem
might be shoehorned into that regime.
29
Frequently, the normative and policy discussions of inter-
national income taxation in the literature, including not only
the academic publications of both economists and lawyers, but
also-and perhaps most importantly-most of the key serious
government analyses containing any normative discussion,
begin and end with an assumption-not an argument-that
the proper goal for U.S. international tax policy is advancing
worldwide economic efficiency. 0 Achieving such efficiency typ-
ically is said to involve two kinds of neutralities. The first is
capital export neutrality (CEN), which is neutral about a
resident's choice between domestic and foreign investments
providing the same pretax rates of return. CEN requires that a
29. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996); H. David Rosenbloom,
The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: International Tax Arbitrage and the "Interna-
tional Tax System," 53 TAX L. REV. 137 (2000).
30. See, e.g., Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 106th Cong., Overview of Present-Law
Rules and Economic Issues in International Taxation (Comm. Print 1999)
[hereinafter JCT Economic Issues Report]; Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 102d Cong., Fac-
tors Affecting the International Competitiveness of the United States 5 (Comm.
Print 1991) [hereinafter JCT Competitiveness Report]; David F. Bradford & U.S.
Treasury Dep't, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 89-90 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
Blueprints]; The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth,
and Simplicity 383 (1985) [hereinafter Treasury II]; Treasury Dep't, Selected Tax
Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce 19 (1996) [hereinafter Treasury
Electronic Commerce Report]; Inland Revenue, Double Taxation Relief For Compa-
nies: A Discussion Paper (1999) (UK Ministry of Finance), available at
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/consult/dtrc.htm. [hereinafter British Green Paper].
The U.S. Treasury study of Subpart F issued in December 2000, after this lecture
was delivered but while in press, contains an elaborate argument favoring capital
export neutrality as the appropriate goal of U.S. international tax policy. Treasury
Dep't., The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corpora-
tions: A Policy Study 23-54 (2000) [hereafter Treasury Subpart F Study].
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resident of any nation pays the same marginal rate of income
taxation regardless of the nation in which she invests. CEN is
not only neutral about where such investments are made but
also is indifferent about which country collects the tax revenue
when capital originating in one country produces income in
another. Typically, economists regard CEN as essential for
worldwide economic efficiency, because the location of invest-
ments would be unaffected by capital income taxes.3'
Sometimes a second kind of neutrality, capital import
neutrality (CIN), is supported. CIN requires that all invest-
ments in a given country pay the same marginal rate of in-
come taxation regardless of the residence of the investor. CIN
thus subjects all business activity within a specific country to
the same overall level of taxation, whether the activity is con-
ducted by a resident or a foreigner. If CIN holds, all savers,
regardless of their residence, receive the same after-tax re-
turns. They therefore face the same prices for future versus
present consumption and the allocation of savings is effi-
cient.a2
CEN usually is said to imply taxation only by the country
of residence. Indeed the economic literature often suggests that
if either national or worldwide economic efficiency is the goal,
that source countries should forgo any tax on foreign business-
es operating within their borders.3 But countries universally
impose source-based taxes whenever there is substantial busi-
ness activity by both foreign and domestic companies. Thus,
CEN in practice has come to mean that if the source country
imposes tax, the residence country should grant a credit for the
foreign tax. To fully implement CEN, the foreign tax credit
should not be limited to the residence country's tax rate; in-
come of foreign subsidiaries should be taxed currently by the
residence country, and no cross crediting of foreign taxes on
31. The Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 23-54, contains a review
of the economic literature.
32. E.g., sources cited in note 30; see also Michael Keen, The Welfare Econom-
ics of Tax Coordination in the European Community, 1993 FISCAL STUDIES, reprint-
ed in MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX, THE ECONOMICS OF TAX POLICY (1996).
33. Several authors have urged that zero is the optimum tax rate on inward
investment. See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Investment and Savings in a
World Economy, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 1086 (1986); JOEL SLEMROD, EFFECT OF TAXA-
TION WITH CAPITAL MOBILITY, IN UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID IN-
COME-CONSUMPTION TAX 115 (Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper & Joseph A.
Pechman eds., 1988).
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income taxed differently at source should be allowed. CIN, on
the other hand, is said to support taxation only by the source
country with the residence country exempting foreign source
income from tax.34
Thus, policy discussion of international income tax policy
is now dominated by a simple two-by-three matrix, where
capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality general-
ly constitute the normative universe. Implementing these poli-
cies requires respectively, worldwide taxation with a foreign
tax credit or "territorial" taxation with foreign earnings exempt
from tax.35 In theory, CEN gives the prime claim to tax inter-
national income to the country of residence and CIN awards
that right to the country of source.
It is by now known that it is impossible to achieve CEN
and CIN simultaneously in the absence of either a worldwide
government or identical income tax bases and rates in all na-
tions.36 This means that the analyst either must choose be-
34. See, e.g., Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income:
An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOmY 11 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990); Robert A. Green,
The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 18, 86 (1993) (urging the United States to move from source-
based income taxation to a residence-based system); Daniel J. Frisch, The Econom-
ics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES
581, 582-87 (Apr. 30, 1990).
35. The Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at ix-xi (making much of
the distinction between 'worldwide" and "territorial" systems).
36. See, e.g., JCT Competitiveness Report, supra note 30, at 5. My favorite
way of making this point is in terms of an irreconcilable conflict among the follow-
ing three simple principles:
Principle 1: People should pay equal taxes on their income regardless of
the country that is the source of that income. In particular, U.S. taxpay-
ers should be treated equally regardless of the source of their income.
Principle 2: All investments in the United States should face the same
burden regardless of whether a U.S. person or a foreign person makes
the investment. In other words, U.S. and foreign-owned investments and
businesses should be treated equally.
Principle 3: Sovereign countries should be free to set their own tax rates
and to vary them as their domestic economic situations demand.
The essential difficulty is that the first two principles can hold simultaneously
only when capital income is taxed at the same rate in all countries. This requires
identical tax systems, including identical tax rates, tax bases, and choices between
source- and residence-based taxation. That has never happened, and it never will.
Moreover, there would be no way to keep such a system in place without violating
Principle 3. Bilateral treaties in which the United States gives benefits to certain
foreign investors or foreign-owned businesses, in exchange for their countries giv-
ing reciprocal benefits to U.S. investors or businesses, also defeats the ability to
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tween these conflicting norms or-since both residence and
source countries exercise their rights to tax income-urge some
"compromise" between them. CEN enjoys the greatest norma-
tive support both in government analyses and in the acade-
my." This is because distortions in the location of invest-
ments are thought to be more costly than distortions in the
allocation of savings. Many economists regard the choice be-
tween CEN and CIN as essentially empirical, turning on the
relative elasticities of savings and investment.38 Since invest-
ment is thought to be more responsive to changes in levels of
taxation, a policy of CEN predominates. But the British econo-
mist Michael Keen emphasizes that "we currently know almost
nothing about the quantitative welfare implications of alterna-
tive tax treatments of cross-national direct investment."39
The conversation is not unanimously in favor of CEN. In
the absence of perfect competition, some economists suggest
that deviations from CIN may enable high marginal cost pro-
ducers to co-exist with, or even drive out low-cost producers. °
Some legal scholars argue for the predominance of source-
based taxation, government documents sometimes hedge their
enthusiasm for CEN, and the U.S. business community consis-
tently opposes CEN in the name of improving the "competitive-
ness" of U.S. multinationals abroad.4 In expressing concern
satisfy Principles 1 and 2 simultaneously. This difficulty makes compromises be-
tween these principles inevitable.
Principle 1 states a requirement of capital export neutrality. Principle 2
states a version of capital import neutrality, although it also expresses a desire for
nondiscrimination either in favor of or against foreign-owned businesses and in-
vestments.
This way of putting the dilemma was first expressed in a speech I gave on
March 1, 1990, to the U.S. chapter of the International Fiscal Association, when I
was serving as Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy). International
Tax Policy Makers Should Strive for Balance, Treasury Official Says, DAILY TAX
REP. BNA, Mar. 2, 1990, at G-7. Kenneth W. Gideon, then the Assistant Secretary
Tax Policy, subsequently delivered much of the speech again, making the same
point. Kenneth W. Gideon, Dinner Speech, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 71, 72-74 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 42-54; Robert J.
Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International
Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975 (1997).
38. E.g., Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International In-
vestment Income, 94 Q.J. ECON. 793, 793-98 (1980).
39. Keen, supra note 32, at 206, and authenticated therein.
40. Id.
41. E.g., Green, supra note 34, at 63-86 (discussing alternative approaches for
enhancing the stability of international income taxation); Terrence R. Chorvat,
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for the "competitiveness" of U.S.-based multinationals, busi-
ness representatives sometimes seem to be suggesting that any
additional U.S. tax will be passed on to consumers in the for-
eign market in the form of higher prices, a somewhat unlikely
scenario, but more often contend that if the U.S. tax system
increases their cost of capital relative to that of foreign compet-
itors, beneficial foreign projects will be forgone and undertaken
by foreign-based companies." There is considerable debate
about the welfare implications if this occurs."
Determined opposition to CEN as the goal of U.S. interna-
tional income tax policy has led the U.S. business community
to vigorously oppose elimination or reduction of the ability of
U.S. multinationals to postpone U.S. taxation of foreign-source
income until repatriated, but it has not yet resulted in the
business community's embracing the CIN-linked policy of ex-
emption of foreign source income.
The idea that CEN should be the lynchpin of U.S. interna-
tional tax policy was first voiced by the Kennedy administra-
tion in connection with its 1962 international tax proposals,
proposals that led to the adoption of Subpart F.' Treasury
since that time often has expressed the view that CEN should
guide policy. A few important examples include Blueprints for
Tax Reform, issued in 1976, President Reagan's tax reform
proposals of 1985, the 1996 Treasury White Paper on the In-
ternational Taxation of Electronic Commerce, and Treasury's
Study of Subpart F, issued in December 2000.45
Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income (George Mason University, Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 00-16, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?cfid=85477&cftoken=89823350&abstract-id=22
4377; National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., The NFTC Foreign Income Project:
International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 1999 TNT 58-17, Mar. 26, 1999,
available in LEXIS, TNT File [hereinafter NFTC Foreign Income Project].
42. Both the U.S. Treasury and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
simply define "competitiveness" as the ability of U.S. fi-ms, headquartered in the
United States with production facilities abroad, to compete with resident compa-
nies in the host country and multinational firms based elsewhere. Treasury
Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 55; JCT Competitiveness Report, supra note
30, at 7-8. The JCT pamphlet also discusses "trade competitiveness" and "standard
of living competitiveness."
43. The Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 56, for example, con-
tends that enhancing "competitiveness" of U.S. multinationals could 'cause a de-
crease in overall economic welfare."
44. Message from the President of the United States Relative to Our Federal
Tax System, H.R. Doc. No. 87-140, at 6-8 (1961).
45. Blueprints, supra note 30, at 89-90; Treasury II, supra note 30, at 383
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Congress has often refused to enact CEN-based proposals,
however, and current law has come to be described routinely
as a compromise between CEN and CIN."6 It is, for example,
now commonplace, whenever international tax issues come
before the taxwriting committees of Congress, for the pam-
phlets of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to de-
scribe a choice or compromise between CEN and CIN as the
normative framework through which international tax policy
issues should be addressed.47
This is no longer just a U.S. phenomenon. The 1999 Brit-
ish Green Paper analyzing their foreign tax credit system and
suggestions for change grounded the analysis and conclusions
in a rather convoluted consideration of CEN and CIN.45
Occasionally, international tax policy analysts give a brief
nod to the misnamed norm of "national neutrality," which
takes a national rather than worldwide point of view. This
norm seeks neutrality between the pretax return on domestic
investments and the return on foreign investments after the
payment of foreign taxes (which is said to represent the return
on foreign investments to the capital exporting country.) In
essence, this norm regards domestic investment as preferable
to foreign investment because the U.S. Treasury gets to keep
the revenue from taxing the income from domestic produc-
tion.49 National neutrality would treat foreign taxes the same
as domestic costs of doing business and allow only a deduction
for foreign income taxes. The AFL-CIO urged replacing the
foreign tax credit with a deduction for foreign taxes in the
1970's,5" and such legislation, the Burke-Hartke Bill, was
introduced and debated, but Congress rejected the proposal."'
("The long standing position of the United States that, as the country of residence,
it has the right to tax worldwide income is considered appropriate to promote tax
neutrality in investment decisions."); Treasury Electronic Commerce Report, supra
note 30, at 19; JCT Economic Issues Report, supra note 30, at 38-57; JCT Com-
petitiveness Report, supra note 30, at 5; Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30,
at 23.
46. E.g., NFTC Foreign Income Project, supra note 41, 7.
47. See, e.g., JCT Economic Issues Report, supra note 30, at 2-4; JCT Compet-
itiveness Report, supra note 30, at 5.
48. British Green Paper, supra note 30, 3.6-3.25.
49. Frisch, supra note 34, at 584-85; see also sources cited in note 30.
50. C. FRED BERGSTEN, THOMAS HORST & THEODORE H. MORAN, AMERICAN
MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS 111-12, 174 (1978).
51. H.R. 62, 93d Cong. (1973); see also S. 2592, 92d Cong. (1971).
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Today, while the national neutrality idea often is mentioned as
a potential norm, national neutrality's policy of allowing only a
deduction for foreign taxes generally is discussed only in pass-
ing; it is routinely dismissed as unwise and unrealistic.52
The relatively simple normative story, which treats inter-
national income tax policy as essentially a choice between CEN
and CIN, however, fails to explain the international income tax
system that actually exists. As I have detailed elsewhere, nei-
ther CEN, CIN, or national neutrality played any important
role in .the development of the U.S. international income tax
rules when they were put in place between 1918 and 1928.53
And, as I have indicated, in 1962, President Kennedy present-
ed to Congress proposals that often are described as designed
to implement CEN as the cornerstone of taxation of interna-
tional business income, but Congress refused to go along.54
The enactment of subpart F in 1962, however, did begin the
characterization of U.S. international tax policy as a compro-
mise between CEN and CIN.
But, even though President Kennedy and Douglas Dillon,
his Treasury Secretary, talked about the virtue of equalizing
the treatment of income from foreign and domestic invest-
ments, it is not accurate to characterize the Kennedy Adminis-
tration in 1962 as endorsing a policy of CEN-as Treasury has
as recently as December 2000."5 President Kennedy's propos-
als were not neutral between investments in developed and
developing countries, offering a tax advantage to the latter.5
Moreover, at the same time President Kennedy was urging
neutrality between foreign and domestic investment as the
guiding light for international tax policy, he also pressed Con-
gress to enact a generous tax credit limited to business invest-
52. See, e.g., Frisch, supra note 34 ("There are many reasons this analysis has
been criticized by economists. My favorite is that it is a very shortsighted way to
maximize U.S. interests. .... ).
53. See Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1049-53.
54. See, e.g., NFTC Foreign Income Project, supra note 41, 64-121. The
Treasury Subpart F Study, in contrast, (mistakenly in my view) describes the 1962
congressional action as an endorsement of capital export neutrality. Treasury
Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 18. ("ITihe Kennedy Administration believed
that the compromise statute did not, to any significant extent, sacrifice its con-
cerns about capital export neutrality . . . but, instead, that it sacrificed the origi-
nal proposal's relative simplicity.").
55. Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 16-19.
56. Message of the President, supra note 44, at 6-8.
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ment within the United States." In 1962, both in the White
House and Congress, encouraging domestic investment and
promoting economic growth within the United States took
political and economic precedence over advancing worldwide
economic efficiency.
The narrow normative focus of the international tax litera-
ture contrasts sharply with the domestic tax policy literature,
of both the academy and the government, where contentions
over normative issues lie at the center of the policy debates."
In domestic tax policy, fairness in taxation tends to hold center
stage. Achieving fair taxation with a minimal loss of economic
efficiency or achieving a proper balance between economic
57. Id. at 3-6.
58. The consumption vs. income tax debate could serve as Exhibit 1 for this
point. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAEz, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, HoW IT
GOT THAT WAY AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE, cbs. 13, 14 and sources cited
therein (1999) [hereinafter U.S. Income Tax].
The Treasury Subpart F Study is a curious instance of a reliance on CEN
as a basis for making international tax policy. At the outset, that study lists the
following multiple goals for U.S. international tax policy: "(1) Meet the revenue
needs determined by Congress in an adequate and fair manner; (2) Minimize com-
pliance and administrative burdens; (3) Minimize distortion of investment decisions
through tax considerations; (4) Conform with international norms, to the extent
possible; and (5) Avoid placing an undue burden on the competitive position of our
nationals." Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 14, at viii (citations omitted).
These criteria also are discussed as grounds for recommendations for options for
change. Id. at 82-95. But it is clear that Treasury's recommendations are funda-
mentally intended to further a policy of capital export neutrality. Equity, for ex-
ample, is treated as identical to capital export neutrality, requiring that "the tax
burden should be imposed equally on all income, without regard to its source"
with Treasury noting that a "more detailed analysis of equity concepts in interna-
tional taxation is beyond the scope of this study." Id. at 82-83 n.3. "Competitive-
ness" is dismissed as having only a little to do with tax considerations, as having
no "reliable basis" for assessment, and as being in conflict with other tax policy
goals, especially economic efficiency. Id. at 55-61, 86. Relatively little discernable
weight is given in the recommendations to the goal of.simplicity, although option
1, ending deferral of foreign source income and consolidating the income of foreign
corporations is claimed to be simpler than the current regime. Id. at 90. As for
conformity with international norms, Treasury concedes that its first option for
change, subjecting all foreign income, including active business income of foreign
subsidiaries to current U.S. income taxation, departs from international norms and
practice: "[N]o major U.S. trading partners ... have completely eliminated defer-
ral. Ending deferral would thus set the U.S. regime apart from the regimes of its
major trading partners." Id. at 90. Martin Sullivan describes the study as "reaf-
firm[ing] that capital export neutrality is still the guiding principle of the U.S.
government in the formulation of international tax policy" and calls the report a
"shrine built to the gods of capital export neutrality." Martin A. Sullivan, Treasury
Study Justifies Easing Rules on Hybrid Entities, 90 TAk NOTES 156, 156-57 (Jan.
8, 2001).
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efficiency and equity is routinely described as the appropriate
quest for tax policy. Even in the economics literature concern-
ing domestic tax policy, where economic efficiency takes prece-
dence, discussion of other norms, particularly equity norms, is
common.
The dominant normative perspective of international tax
policy debates-limited to a choice or a compromise between
CEN and CIN-both inhibits an adequate understanding of the
normative underpinnings of international income tax policy
and improperly limits serious consideration of alternative poli-
cies. There are three major problems with relying on world-
wide economic efficiency (and thus CEN) as the foundation for
international income tax policy. First, it seeks to improve
worldwide rather than national well-being. Second, the idea of
economic efficiency is too limited. Third, focusing on economic
efficiency as the guiding light excludes other important values.
A. Rejecting a Worldwide Perspective
We naturally give primacy to our own citizens in setting
national policy, including tax policy. This is both a matter of
historical circumstance-some would say accident-and, more
importantly, of political organization. In our democratic soci-
ety, we the people have organized a national government to
protect our safety and security, to maintain our liberty, and to
promote the well-being of our citizens and residents. By assign-
ing the task of improving the lot of the nation's citizens, in-
cluding those who are least advantaged, to our government, we
have made both economic growth and redistribution of income
or wealth a matter of national, rather than worldwide, concern.
Likewise, the education of the nation's children and protection
of our citizens from economic losses due to ill health, disability,
or unemployment, along with ensuring economic security dur-
ing retirement, are core functions of our national and state
governments. Throughout the world, the substance of these
protections varies from country to country, depending in de-
mocracies like ours ultimately on what the voters say.
National governments assign tax burdens and provide
benefits. No function is more at the core of government than
its system of taxation. It is no accident that the economic and
political unification of Europe has stumbled over issues of
taxation. Taxes are imposed by national governments (or their
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subdivisions); the power to tax is rarely delegated to multina-
tional organizations.
Since World War II, international law has become more
protective of fundamental human rights of people throughout
the world, even when it limits a nation's internal sovereignty.
But I have found no one who argues for grounding U.S. inter-
national income tax policy on worldwide economic efficiency (or
CEN) who also proposes assessing the fairness of U.S. income
tax policy on a worldwide basis. More importantly, no nation
has ever made a genuine commitment to worldwide equity.59
We often take quite seriously our obligations to foreigners and
show respect for their rights, but we regard our obligation for
the well-being of our fellow citizens as more pressing than for
people in need elsewhere in the world.6"
Why in formulating international tax policy, should we
evaluate the distribution of tax burdens (and government bene-
fits, including transfers) within national borders, but be indif-
ferent about where enhanced economic output occurs, whom it
benefits, and what national treasury obtains the tax revenues?
Why does our higher obligation to U.S. citizens and legal resi-
dents not also apply to promoting economic output and improv-
ing economic well-being?6 '
When we are talking, as now, about making policy, we
cannot ignore history or culture. The freedom and indepen-
dence, as well as the economic welfare, of people varies from
59. For a good theoretical discussion of nations' obligations of international
redistribution, see, e.g., CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1979).
60. For a nuanced discussion of this position, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW
OF PEOPLES (1999).
61. Some have suggested that claims by U.S. policymakers favoring worldwide
economic efficiency is merely strategic behavior to obtain cooperation from other
nations, supplying what game theorists label a "focal point." See generally ERIC
RASMUSEN, GAM1ES AND INFORMATION 28-29 (2d ed. 1994) (describing focal points).
A similar idea is advanced in a different context by JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC
A. POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL RHETORIC IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A RATIO-
NAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (manuscript, Nov., 2000), available at
http'//papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract_id=250042. Since I am concerned here with
the normative basis of U.S. international tax policy, rather than strategic behavior
to implement U.S. policy, I ignore this potential strategic function of the world-
wide efficiency norm. But see ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLI-
TICS 7, 211-30 (1981) (describing international relations as a "recurring struggle for
wealth and power ... in a state of anarchy").
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nation to nation. This simply is fact. In the absence of a world
government, this is how it must be.
Moreover, although I cannot develop the argument here, I
believe this is how it should be. Notwithstanding the utopian
philosophical ambitions for worldwide harmony implied by
those who urge taking a "one-world view," I agree with those
political philosophers who insist that a world government-a
political entity exercising the powers now held by national
governments-would likely live in a constant state of civil
unrest, as various populations and regions contest for freedom,
autonomy, and self-government. A "world government" would
likely become a dictatorship.62
National boundaries often may be arbitrary and no doubt
they will continue to shift as they have over time, but they
demarcate the political organizations responsible for the well-
being of the people within their territory. The people of a na-
tion often share a common language and common political
antecedents. In democratic societies, national boundaries deter-
mine the jurisdiction of the people's representatives and there-
by define the scope of political (and often social) operation.
More than a century ago, John Stuart Mill used the idea of
nationality to describe a people's culture, describing a national-
ity as:
[a] portion of mankind united among themselves by common
sympathies... which make them cooperate with each other
more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the
same government, and desire that it should be government
by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. 3
It is a mistake to believe that the globalization of markets
for goods, services, and capital signals the demise of national
62. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 60, at 36 (Rawls discussion of this view, based
on similar views set forth by Immanuel Kant in PERPETUAL PEACE (Liberal Arts
Press 1948) (1795), by David Hume in Of the Balance of Power, in POLITICAL
ESSAYS (K. Haakonssen ed., 1994), and by F. H. Hinsley in POWER AND THE PUR-
SUIT OF PEACE 162 (1996) (discussing the ideas of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Gib-
bon regarding universal monarchy)). This, of course, is not to suggest that there
are not important roles for international organizations such as the United Nations,
the World Trade Organization, and the OECD, to name the three most relevant to
international tax policy.
63. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS (1862), quoted in Rawls, supra note
60, at 23 n.17.
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identity or national politics. Economic globalization does not
imply global government. Modem developments, such as mo-
bile capital and e-commerce, may limit the ability of any sover-
eign state to singlehandedly control its economic destiny, and
therefore may usher in a new era of multinational cooperation
but they do not mean the end of nationalism.
Each country's history and culture, in conjunction with the
ongoing goals and priorities of its people, will continue to
shape the lives of its residents and citizens. U.S. families and
U.S. voters, along with those of other nations, may well travel
more frequently transnationally and are surely spending more
time cruising the boundaryless infoimation highway. And the
paychecks and job security of many Americans now depend, at
least in part, on economic circumstances outside our nation's
borders. But most of the important economic facts of our lives
involving government action-the education of our children,
our families' protections against disability and ill health, the
economic security of our retired parents, our tax liabilities, and
our government benefits-are still determined by national
policies and national politics.
Tax policy decisions, including decisions regarding a
country's tax treatment of international income, should be, and
inevitably are, decided based on a nation's capacity, culture,
economics, politics, and history. In democracies, such decisions
are determined by the votes of the nation's citizens and their
representatives. Taxation without representation is still tyran-
ny.
Unfortunately, international income tax policy does not
enjoy a harmony between national and worldwide interests
similar to international trade. The consensus of economists
insists that a policy of free trade not only improves worldwide
efficiency but also improves the economic efficiency of each
nation that reduces trade barriers unilaterally.' But many
economists claim that the benefits of free trade are not repli-
cated by free flows of capital, and no such confluence between
national and worldwide gains has been claimed for internation-
al tax policy.65
64. The classic statement of this is DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 81 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1911) (1817). See also
Elhanan Helpman, The Structure of Foreign Trade, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999,
at 121 (discussing David Ricardo's theories and recent developments).
65. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between
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International income tax policy guided by worldwide eco-
nomic efficiency is concerned with increasing economic output
and reducing deadweight loss, wherever it occurs. The goal of
worldwide economic efficiency tells tax policymakers-the
legislators who enact the law and the representatives of the
President who negotiate tax treaties-to seek improvements in
the amount and/or allocation of world capital, regardless of
who benefits and of the revenue consequences to the U.S. trea-
sury. Worldwide efficiency tells a U.S. policymaker to respond
with equal vigor to avoidance of a foreign country's taxes and
avoidance of U.S. taxes. This criterion is indifferent both about
whose well-being is increased and which nation's treasury col-
lects the income taxes that are assessed. If a choice must be
made between benefitting the nation's own citizens and resi-
dents or benefitting people elsewhere, the principle of world-
wide economic efficiency urges policymakers to embrace the
larger benefit without regard to where it occurs or who bene-
fits. Worldwide economic efficiency does not heed love of coun-
try.
But why should a U.S. President or members of Congress
put aside "narrow" national interests to fashion U.S. tax policy
in a manner apathetic to whether benefits flow to U.S. citizens
or citizens of other nations? Why should they not care whether
taxes flow into the U.S. treasury or to some foreign nation?
Paying attention to the distribution of the burdens and bene-
fits of taxation among U.S. families and to the revenue conse-
quences of the tax law is a fundamental obligation of both
legislators and the executive branch in our democracy.
Let me not be misunderstood. By urging that this nation's
international tax policy be fashioned to advance the interests
of the American people, I am not calling for either American
imperialism or American isolationism. Nor am I suggesting
any retreat from this nation's engagement in the world econo-
Trade in Widgets and Dollars, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1998, at 7 (distinguishing
the case for free trade and for liberal capital flows); see also Joel B. Slemrod,
Effect of Taxation With International Capital Mobility, in UNEASY COIPROMISE,
supra note 19, at 115, 121-22; Joel B. Slemrod, Free Trade Taxation and Protec-
tionist Taxation, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 471 (1995) (comparing international tax
policy to international trade policy). As Peggy Musgrave has pointed out, foreign
investment involves transfers abroad of productive resources whereas free trade
involves the most productive use of existing resources. (Communication to the
author on file.)
2001] 1375
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
my or from political cooperation with other nations and peo-
ples. To the contrary, I am convinced that longstanding U.S.
leadership and participation on matters of international tax
policy, beginning in the period following World War I, along
with our participation in multilateral restructurings of interna-
tional monetary and trade relationships beginning after World
War II and continuing until today, has well served-and will
continue to serve-the interests of the American people.
Advocates of worldwide economic efficiency as the guiding
principle of U.S. international income tax policy sometimes
point to the shortcomings of "national neutrality"-a policy
allowing only a deduction for foreign income taxes-as a rea-
son for eschewing a national point of view in fashioning inter-
national tax policy.6" But the inadequacies of that policy do
not support worldwide economic efficiency as the proper goal.
They serve instead simply to demonstrate that any nation
must take the responses of foreign governments into account in
making international tax policy, and as a reminder that coop-
erative multilateral policymaking may benefit both U.S. citi-
zens and foreigners. National neutrality is an example of a
policy that may advance national self-interest in the short
term but prove self-defeating over the long run.
In some circumstances, domestic investment may be more
beneficial to Americans' well-being than foreign investment.67
At other times, at least for some categories of investment, the
converse may be true.68 And pursuing a policy of capital ex-
port neutrality, sometimes may best serve the interests of U.S.
citizens and residents.69 But which of these claims is true is
66. See generally Frisch, supra note 34, at 583-84; Treasury Subpart F Study,
supra note 30, at 36-37; see also supra note 51.
67. Indeed, although President Kennedy's tax proposals of 1962 are widely
credited with ushering in an era when CEN formed the linchpin of U.S. interna-
tional tax policy, see, e.g., Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 16-19,
President Kennedy concluded that national policy should favor domestic invest-
ments through a combination of neutrality between domestic and foreign income
generally and an investment tax credit limited to domestic investments. President's
Tax Message, note 44.
68. The period following World War II is the most obvious instance. The Ken-
nedy Administration, in urging repeal in 1962 of postponement of U.S. tax until
the income of foreign subsidiaries is repatriated, determined that promoting pri-
vate investment in Europe and Japan and other developed countries was no longer
appropriate. President's Tax Message, supra note 44, at 6-7. Congress did not
enact this recommendation.
69. The Treasury Subpart F Study asserts, without offering any independent
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an empirical question from a national perspective, a question
that may depend on a host of economic, political, and social
conditions that vary from time to time. Such empirical claims
are very different from the contention that pursuing worldwide
economic efficiency is the appropriate principle for formulating
U.S. international income tax policy. Making tax policy choices,
including international tax policy decisions, routinely requires
policymakers to select among competing and controversial
empirical claims. Needless to say, the empirical claims about
the consequences of alternative international tax policies are.
often controversial.
B. Too Narrow a View of Economic Efficiency
In denying that a worldwide perspective is the proper lens
for U.S. international income tax policy, I am not rejecting an
important role for considerations of economic efficiency in for-
mulating that policy. But I believe the proper function of eco-
nomic efficiency in this context is to ask-from the national
perspective-what international income tax rules will enhance
Americans' standard of living, now and in future generations,
for example, by promoting economic growth in the United
States.7" As with domestic tax policy, the proper question is
about the effects of international tax rules on the economic
well-being, the welfare, of U.S. citizens and residents.
evidence, that national welfare always demands taxation of outward investment at
a rate at least as high as domestic investment. Treasury Subpart F Study, supra
note 30, at 41-42. This conclusion starts from the premise that "national neutrali-
ty"-allowing only a deduction for foreign taxes-maximizes national welfare, fol-
lowed by criticisms of articles in the economics literature that suggest that under
some circumstances it would be in the national interest to favor foreign invest-
ments. Id. at 36-41.
70. This way of putting the economic efficiency question is somewhat different
from the way it is usually put by economists. Economists typically, for example,
place greater emphasis on individual choice. If economic output were to be in-
creased by a policy to encourage greater savings, an economist would measure the
gain in welfare by reducing the increase in output by a measure of the sacrifice
by individuals due to the increased savings. See, e.g., Treasury Subpart F Study,
supra note 30, at 25 n.3. This distinction is not important to the point I am mak-
ing here. Economists also typically measure economic efficiency with reference to a
world without taxes. See, e.g., id. at 27. I regard this as an inapt comparison
since a world without taxes is a world without government, a world without laws
or law enforcement, hardly a measuring rod for an economically efficient world.
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All taxes have efficiency costs; they change incentives to
engage in various activities and affect the allocation of resourc-
es. If economic efficiency were the sole goal of tax policy, we
would see only per capita taxes, head taxes. Margaret Thatch-
er tried a little experiment in the United Kingdom along these
lines that proved a political disaster.7'
Taxes on wages or consumption are more realistic alterna-
tives to the income tax. Economists by now have reached a
strong consensus that the economically efficient tax rate on
income from capital is zero, a level of taxation associated with
wage or consumption taxes, but not income taxes. Moreover,
the international aspects of wage or consumption taxation are
far easier to solve than those of income taxation. Wage taxes
are allocated to the nation where the work occurs. The ineffi-
ciency that causes, since different levels of taxation may dis-
tort people's choices about where to work or live, has been
widely accepted on the ground that labor is rather immobile,
although that may be changing, especially within Europe.
Likewise, by agreeing multilaterally to impose "indirect" con-
sumption taxes on a destination basis, and allocating consump-
tion tax revenues to the nation where consumption occurs,
nations now routinely tax consumption at varying rates with-
out distorting private decisions about where to invest or locate
productive activity.72
If international tax policy were intended solely to further
worldwide economic efficiency, we would replace our income
tax with a wage or consumption tax and press other countries
to substitute wage or consumption taxes for their income taxes.
For example, instead of refusing to credit Bolivia's cash flow
business tax in the 1990's," we would have embraced it. If we
really believed the widespread claims that an international
71. See, e.g., Peter Smith, Lessons From the British Poll Tax Disaster, 44
NAT'L TAX J. 421 (1991); Eric M. Zolt, Prospects for Fundamental Tax Reform:
United States vs. Japan, 83 TAX NOTES 903, 905 (May 10, 1999) ("[Olne could
design a tax system that imposes a head tax on each individual over 18 years old.
While a head tax may strike some as fair, the fall of Margaret Thatcher's govern-
ment regarding replacing a property tax with a per person 'community charge'
illustrates the political costs of misreading what the public considers fair.")
72. The growth of e-commerce and related developments, however, may be
causing new problems for the international allocation and collection of consumption
taxes. See Section II.
73. Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George Zodrow, Credibility Concerns Doom Bo-
livian Flat Tax, 12 TAX NOTES INT' 825, 829 (Mar. 11, 1996).
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"race to the bottom" would soon (or even ultimately) drive
taxes on income from capital toward zero, from the perspective
of economic efficiency, we would applaud rather than lament
such a development. (It certainly would not be labeled "harm-
ful tax competition."74 ) But our foreign tax credit rules instead
stimulate other nations to adopt taxes on income, whether or
not their own notions of fairness or of the appropriate trade-off
between fairness and efficiency call for income taxation at all.
Notwithstanding the advantages in terms of economic efficien-
cy of consumption and wage taxes over income taxes, I assume
for purposes of this analysis that the United States (and its
major trading partners) will continue to rely on income taxes
as a major source of revenue (essentially for reasons of fair-
ness, as discussed in the next Section).
The foreign tax credit is intended to collect U.S. income
taxes when other countries do not impose such taxes (at a rate
roughly comparable to our own), both because we think fair-
ness demands it and to stem the outflow of capital to other
countries that we are concerned otherwise might occur. The
limitation on foreign tax credits is intended to protect the abili-
ty of the United States to collect taxes on U.S. source income.
As I have indicated, when evaluating these rules (or other
international income tax provisions), economists today seldom
ask how these rules affect the economic welfare of U.S. citizens
or residents. 5 Instead, they generally accept worldwide eco-
nomic efficiency as the operative norm, and generally conclude
that the United States should follow a policy of capital export
neutrality. It is worth reviewing how the economics literature
came to regard CEN as the appropriate efficiency-enhancing
norm.
74. OECD, HARMwUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998).
75. There are exceptions. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX & R. GLENN
HUBBARD, TAXING MULTINATIONALS (NBER Working Paper No. 7920, 2000), avail-
able at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W7920 (contending that, in some circumstanc-
es, national welfare may be maximized by a foreign tax credit coupled with a poli-
cy of deferral); MARTIN FELDSTEIN, TAXES, LEVERAGE AND THE NATIONAL RETURN
ON OUTBOUND FOREIGN DiREcT INVESTMENT (NBER Working Paper No. 4689,
1994), available at http'J/papers.nber.org/papersW4689 (contending that the United
States might be better off taxing foreign income at a lower rate than domestic
income). But see Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 36-41 (criticizing
this literature).
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The seminal analyses of the efficiency aspects of foreign
investments by U.S. persons were published in 1963 and 1969
by Peggy Musgrave." The economics literature since has been
greatly influenced by her work." Musgrave examined only
outbound investment from both a theoretical and empirical
perspective and concluded that following a policy of capital
export neutrality would maximize worldwide welfare."8 She
also concluded that a policy of allowing only a deduction for
foreign income taxes, which she labeled "national neutrality,"
would maximize the national welfare of the capital-exporting
nation."9 Importantly, although there have been numerous
applications and extensions of Musgrave's work, there has
been no comprehensive reexamination of these issues-for
example, to assess whether Musgrave's proposed policy of na-
tional neutrality would have well-served or would now well-
serve the interests of the United States-in the 30 years since
her work was first published."
Musgrave's analysis was quite straightforward. From a
worldwide perspective, she asked what international income
tax policies of capital-exporting nations would maximize the
sum of domestic and foreign returns on investments and do-
mestic and foreign taxes-the sum of pretax returns-without
76. PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS (1963) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,
UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME (1969) [hereinafter U.S.
TAXATION].
77. For a review of this literature, see Donald J. Rousslang, Deferral and the
Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 53 NA'L TAX J. 589 (2000).
78. See generally Musgrave, U.S. Taxation, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential
Reconsideration, 52 NATL TAX J. 385, 402 (1999) [hereinafter Reconsideration]
(calling for such work). Some may regard Rousslang, supra note 77, as such an
effort but it essentially is a critical review of the prior literature, virtually all of
which also is cited by Hines. Rousslang's analysis is repeated in the Treasury
Subpart F Study, which also reviews and criticizes the extant economic literature
assessing international tax policy from the perspective of national welfare. Trea-
sury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 23-54. This Treasury Study concludes
that "Musgrave's results have stood the test of time and still appear to provide
the best guide for determining appropriate tax policy." Id. at 25. There are, how-
ever, reasons to be concerned with this review. For example, some economic stud-
ies are criticized for their failure to consider alternative taxes that might "opti-
mize" policy, id. at 31, 32, 40, but a paper by Treasury economists James Mackie
and Donald Rousslang is praised for analyzing "the more realistic case ... in
which tax authorities are unable to impose optimal taxes on the other types of in-
come. . . . " Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
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regard to where in the world returns occur or taxes are collect-
ed." From the perspective of worldwide economic efficiency,
the best policy is one that has as few efficiency costs as possi-
ble. A tax provision is regarded as inefficient whenever the
worldwide allocation of investment capital-its location-is
different than it would be in the absence of taxes.82 As noted
earlier, taking a worldwide efficiency perspective, CEN gener-
ally is thought to dominate CIN because the location of invest-
ments is thought to be more sensitive to tax-induced differenc-
es in rates of return than the quantity of savings." Avoiding
locational distortions of investment therefore is regarded as
the most efficient policy.
Subsequent empirical work has tended to support
Musgrave's conclusions in this regard, although at least one
important analysis suggests that a combination of CEN and
CIN will maximize worldwide efficiency.' Likewise, recent
empirical work has confirmed that locational decisions are
sensitive to tax rates, although much of this work considers
choices among foreign locations once the decision to invest
abroad has been taken."
When she shifts to a national perspective-which she
unfortunately labels "national neutrality"-Musgrave treats
returns earned both here and abroad on investments by U.S.
persons and corporations as increasing the welfare of the
American people, along with taxes paid to the U.S. govern-
81. See generally Musgrave, Economic Analysis, supra note 76; Musgrave, U.S.
Taxation, supra note 76.
82. In this regard, Musgrave's analysis suffers from the general difficulty of
using a world without taxes as a baseline since a market economy simply cannot
function in the absence of government institutions, which must be financed
through taxation. But, in this instance, investors seeking the highest after-tax
rates of return will locate investments where the pretax rates of returns are high-
est if all investment income is taxed identically. Of course, variations in tax rates
on investment income among countries are commonplace.
83. Musgrave originally avoided this comparison by assuming that the volume
of savings is not affected at all by changes in the rate of return. See Rousslang,
supra note 77, at 590-91.
84. Horst, supra note 38; see also Rousslang, supra note 59, at 591-93 (review-
ing the subsequent literature). Much of the subsequent economic literature either
assumes or urges that income taxes are not levied by the source country. See, e.g.,
Rousslang, supra note 77; see also Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at
30-31 (criticizing Horst's conclusions).
85. See text accompanying note 82.
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ment.86 In contrast, taxes paid to a foreign government are
simply a cost from the U.S. perspective." This means that
maximum benefits accrue to the United States when pretax re-
turns on domestic investments are equal to after-tax returns
on foreign investments, implying a policy of allowing only a
deduction for foreign taxes.88
The most troubling aspect of Musgrave's conclusion in this
regard is that, given the levels of taxes prevalent throughout
the world since World War I, allowing only a deduction for
foreign taxes likely would have resulted in little or no U.S.
investment abroad, surely little or no direct investment in the
OECD countries where the bulk of outbound U.S. investment
now resides. In many instances, including most of Europe,
Canada, and Japan, the combined tax rate on foreign invest-
ments by U.S. companies would approach 100% (taking into
account both corporate and individual-level income taxes) if
only a deduction were allowed for foreign taxes. An empirical
test of whether the American people would be better off today
without the investments made abroad during the past 82 years
(since the enactment of the foreign tax credit) by U.S. multina-
tionals is, of course, not possible, but I find it very hard to
believe that we would be. Nevertheless, Musgrave's analysis
has dominated the international income tax policy literature
for more than three decades.
Despite their widespread acceptance by public finance
economists and many government analyses of international tax
policy, there are a number of reasons today to question Peggy
Musgrave's conclusions.89 Let me offer a few observations
that, for me at least, raise serious questions about the ongoing
validity of some of Musgrave's conclusions, particularly her
conclusions about the appropriate U.S. international income
tax policy to advance our national well-being.
First, Musgrave's analysis was done in the 1960's, at a
time when economists had great faith in the power of domestic
fiscal (and monetary) policy to enhance the economic conditions
86. See U.S. TAXATION, supra note 76.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. A comprehensive analysis of these issues in the current context to reex-
amine Musgrave's conclusions, especially with regard to enhancing national well-
being, is overdue. Such an effort, however, is beyond the scope of this endeavor.
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of U.S. citizens. Full employment in the United States, for
example, was thought to be achievable simply by fine-tuning
fiscal policy. Needless to say, if this were true, we would be far
less dependent than we are on worldwide economic conditions
generally (and on savings and investment flows from abroad).
Since the time of Musgrave's work, governments, including the
U.S. government (beginning with the oil shocks of the late
1970's), often have found it difficult to achieve and maintain
full employment. Today, both the citizenry and the economics
profession are far less confident of the ability of the U.S. Presi-
dent and Congress to obtain beneficial economic results for the
American people.0
Second, Musgrave assumes a first-best world, one where
markets are perfectly competitive and governments are well-
behaved.9 This means, for example, that there are no econo-
mies of scale or scope to be achieved by U.S. corporations
through investments abroad, an assumption that eliminates
one of the major reasons identified by international business
analysts for foreign investments of multinational corpora-
tions.92 To take but one example, economies of scale common-
ly occur when the benefits of successful research and develop-
ment, patents, and business processes can be exploited
worldwide rather than just domestically. Licensing or sharing
such knowledge with unrelated foreign third parties may not
be a realistic alternative. Some observers have also suggested
that the firms principally engaged in foreign direct investment
may be operating in an "oligopolistic environment."" Like-
wise, there are no externalities in Musgrave's analysis, such as
those that have been widely urged for research and develop-
ment expenditures undertaken by multinational corporations
and by some observers for headquarters operations general-
ly.94 Musgrave also fails to take into account any potential
90. Nevertheless, for example, the Treasury Subpart F Study is often critical
of economic studies that fail to assume governments can readily adjust other tax
policies to make residents better off.
91. Musgrave, Economic Analysis, supra note 76.
92. See, e.g., JOHN H. DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOB-
AL ECONOMY 75-86 (1993).
93. Id. at 437-39, 565.
94. GARY C. HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT
FOR REFORM 8-17, 77-94, 131-70 (1992). Of course, if stimulation of domestic re-
search and development expenditures were simply the, public policy goal, a variety
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political benefits to the United States that have resulted (espe-
cially in the years following World War II) and may result
from some foreign direct investments.
Musgrave also ignores the fact that the tax policies of
government may not be optimal. For example, when she was
writing (and at certain other times), the United States provid-
ed a generous tax credit available only for investment in equip-
ment used in the United States.95 Depreciation allowances
also often contain advantages for domestic investments. 6
Elsewhere in the world, the rules for dividend relief in
schemes for integration of corporate and shareholder income
taxes have tended to favor domestic investments.97
Musgrave also ignores the practical inability to preclude
cross-crediting of foreign taxes, cross-crediting that has always
occurred in the U.S. system whether a per-country, overall, or
basket method of calculating the foreign tax credit was in ef-
fect.98 Our own history, along with the experience of other
nations, such as the United Kingdom, which in practice per-
mits considerable cross-crediting despite its claim to have an
item-by-item method of limiting their foreign tax credit, dem-
onstrates that a significant amount of cross-crediting is un-
avoidable as a practical matter. 9 The ability to aggregate or
cross-credit foreign taxes imposed at different rates inevitably
affects tax incentives for locating investments.
The key point here is that Musgrave is examining a hypo-
thetical first-best world, not the second- or third-best one we
live in. This is common practice in the economics profession,
but it suggests caution in accepting her policy conclusions.
of strategies for subsidizing such activities exist. The income tax, for example,
currently provides a tax credit for such expenses and allows them to be expensed
currently (IRC § 174); see also Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 39
(concluding that cutting taxes on domestic corporate investment also would favor
R&D expenditures).
95. IRC § 46 (before amendment in 1986).
96. IRC § 168(g)(1)(A), (B), (h).
97. See generally Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of the
U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction to The Issues, in
TREASURY DEP'T & ALI, INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAXES 3 (1998). In such circumstances, if the policy goal is neutrality for
foreign and domestic investments, it may be appropriate to provide some offsetting
advantage to foreign investments.
98. See Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1055 n.138.
99. See, e.g., British Green Paper, supra note 30.
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Third, Musgrave assumes that a dollar of foreign invest-
ment is a dollar of domestic investment lost; in other words,
that foreign investment substitutes for domestic investment
dollar for dollar.' 0 The function of tax policy under such cir-
cumstances is simply to affect the allocation of a fixed supply
of capital between domestic and foreign investments. This
treatment may be reasonable for portfolio investment, which is
far more volatile than direct investment and which, because of
its liquidity, can readily move in response to changes in rates
of return (although the supply of portfolio investment may be
affected by international tax policy.)'"' But there is consider-
able evidence that much foreign direct investment by U.S.
multinationals is complementary to domestic investment rath-
er than a substitute for it.' John Dunning, for example, in-
sists that "increasingly, outward and inward investment are
not in competition with one another."' 3 Musgrave, in con-
trast, assumes that exports are perfect substitutes for foreign
investments.0 4
There are, however, many instances where obtaining mar-
ket share abroad through exports is not possible due, for exam-
ple, to tariff and nontariff barriers, and foreign direct invest-
ment is the only viable option. By capturing foreign markets
more effectively than could be done through exports, foreign
investment may help provide companies with revenues to fi-
nance additional domestic and foreign investments. Likewise,
much resource-seeking foreign direct investment, for oil, food
stuffs and minerals, for example, is often complementary to
domestic investment. Some analysts have suggested that bene-
ficial treatment of foreign income may be appropriate whenev-
er foreign investment is complementary to domestic invest-
ment or to desirable domestic activities.0 5
100. Musgrave, U.S. Taxation, supra note 76, at 30, 55.
101. On direct investment, see UN Report, supra note 9, at 141-53. On portfo-
lio investment, see also Rousslang, supra note 77, at 594.
102. See UN Report, supra note 9, at 152-53; Dunning, supra note 92, at 568-
70; Hines, Reconsideration, supra note 80, at 395-96; Hufbauer, supra note 94, at
65, 131-70.
103. Dunning, supra note 92, at 569.
104. Musgrave, U.S. Taxation, at 30-31, 55.
105. Hines, Reconsideration, supra note 80, at 396-97. But see Harry Grubert &
John Mutti, Taxing Multinationals in a World With Portfolio Flows and R&D: Is
Capital Export Neutrality Obsolete? 2 INVL TAX & PUB. FIN. 439-57 (1995).
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In addition, a number of commentators have noted that
the U.S. policy of not taxing foreign earnings until they are
repatriated creates an incentive for U.S. multinationals to
undercapitalize their foreign subsidiaries."6 This reduces the
effect of foreign investment displacing domestic investment.
Fourth, Musgrave entirely ignores individual-level taxes
on both foreign and domestic investments, probably on the
assumption that they will have an equal impact on both. But
the international tax economist James Hines, has found that,
for U.S. multinationals, one dollar of reported foreign profit-
ability is associated with the same level of dividend payments
to common shareholders as three dollars of reported domestic
profitability.' This means that the U.S. classical system of
taxing corporate profits is more burdensome for firms with
foreign income than for those with domestic income only. In
fact, the U.S. Treasury receives greater tax revenues from the
foreign operations of U.S. companies by taxing individual in-
come than by taxing the income of the corporations them-
selves. 8 Hines speculates that "[flirms reporting foreign
profits may have greater need than do others to signal their
profitability in the form of dividend payments to common
shareholders, because market participants are particularly
skeptical of reported earnings that may be denominated in
foreign currencies, are subject to exchange rate risk, capital
controls, subvention by foreign managers, and various forms of
interference by foreign governments." 9 Hines concludes that
this additional cost of capital associated with foreign invest-
ment may be a reason for beneficial treatment of foreign in-
vestment at the corporate level."0
106. Hines, Reconsideration, supra note 80, at 400; James R. Hines, Jr., Credit
and Deferral as International Investment Incentives, 55 J. PUB. ECON. 323-47
(1994); Hans-Werner Sinn, Taxation and the Birth of Foreign Subsidiaries, in
TRADE, WELFARE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MURRAY C. KEMP
325-52 (Horst Herberg & Ngo Van Long eds., 1993); TIMOTHY ScOTt NEWLON, TAX
POLICY AND THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM'S FINANCIAL POLICY AND INVESTMENT DECI-
SIONS (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University).
107. Hines, Reconsideration, supra note 80, at 397; James R. Hines, Jr., Divi-
dends and Profits: Some Unsubtle Foreign Influences, 51 FIN. 661-89 (1996).
108. Hines, Reconsideration, supra note 80, at 397.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 397-98. But see Rousslang, supra note 77, at 593-94 (suggesting that
corporations could repatriate foreign earnings and pay the residual U.S. tax to
finance any additional dividends that shareholders may require).
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Fifth, Musgrave's analysis of international income tax
policy occurred at a time when the United States was the
world's largest capital exporter."' Capital imports at that
time were small and presumably were thought to have little
effect on the economic well-being of Americans. Thus,
Musgrave limited her analysis to the tax treatment of out-
bound U.S. investment and ignores entirely the tax treatment
of foreign-owned investments in the United States. But as
Figures 1 and 2112 demonstrate, times have changed. Today
the United States is the world's second largest capital import-
er."' Our large and recurring trade deficits are financed by
capital from abroad. Gross flows of capital both from and into
the United States are very large and growing each year. For
the foreseeable future, the United States will be both a large
exporter and importer of capital, of both direct and portfolio
investments. It is simply not possible today to assess the effect
of U.S. international tax policy on the well-being of U.S. citi-
zens without taking both outbound and inbound flows of capi-
tal into account.
Despite the favorable tax treatment it receives, the stock
of foreign direct investment abroad from the United States is
considerably smaller both as a percentage of U.S. GDP and as
a percentage of U.S. gross capital formation than the compara-
ble ratios for the stock of foreign direct investment of other
industrialized nations."4 For example, the ratio of the U.S.
stock of foreign direct investment abroad to GDP is less than
one-half the ratio of the United Kingdom or the Netherlands,
and the increase in that ratio since 1980 has been relatively
small for the United States, compared to the rest of the
world." ' U.S. multinationals have been exceptional in their
tendency to concentrate activities, particularly research and
development, and resources at home, that is, in the United
States."6
With regard to inbound direct investment, the World Eco-
nomic Forum ranked the United States first among industrial-
111. See Figure 1.
112. See Figures 1 and 2.
113. See supra note 26.
114. See UN Report, supra note 9, at 143, 152.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 151.
20011 1387
BROOK. J. INTL L.
ized nations and fourth worldwide (behind Singapore, Hong
Kong, and China) as a favorable location for investment."7
This nation's flexible labor markets, our technological and
innovative capacities, the strength of our service sector, partic-
ularly for financial services, and the high quality of U.S. man-
agement and marketing skills on which foreign investors may
draw have apparently been the most important factors contrib-
uting to our high ranking."'
From the perspective of tax policy, the most salient issue
for inbound direct investment is the U.S. corporate income tax,
which unlike the corporate taxes of many other nations, does
not provide any relief from the double taxation of divi-
dends."9 Because of her exclusive focus on outbound invest-
ment, however, Musgrave does not address any issues of do-
mestic corporate income tax policy, a practice also inexplicably
generally followed by most other economic analyses of interna-
tional income tax policy.
It is not clear to me exactly how the benefits of inbound
investment would be taken into account in the formula used by
Musgrave and other economists to measure the national wel-
fare effects of foreign investments. 2 ° Typically economists
treat rates of return of foreign investment as accruing to the
suppliers of capital. But the benefits of inbound direct invest-
117. See id. at 150 (citing the 1997 study of the World Economic Forum).
118. Id.
119. See generally Graetz & Warren, supra note 97, at 3.
120. Rousslang notes that none of the analyses to date "accounts for the sub-
stantial two-way flows of international corporate investments that are actually
observed," but he claims that so long as countries can cooperate, these flows
should "do little to alter the optimal tax strategy" to "maximize global welfare."
Rousslang, supra note 77, at 595. More comprehensive analysis than he offers,
however, will be necessary to evaluate the validity of that claim and Rousslang
offers no observations regarding the effects of two-way capital flows if the goal is
national well-being rather than global. The Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note
30, at 38, points out that the optimum policy for capital importing nations is
sometimes to tax inbound investment income at zero, or up to the tax rate of the
capital-exporting nation if that nation allows a foreign tax credit, and in general
to balance the benefits of inbound investment against the revenue lost from lower-
ing taxes on such investment. But such flexibility in making tax policy may not
exist as a practical matter. For example, it would not be possible politically in the
United States to tax U.S. source business income earned by a foreign-owned corpo-
ration at a rate lower than the rate applicable to U.S. corporations, and our com-
mitment to nondiscrimination prohibits a higher rate. Therefore, adjusting the rate
of tax on inbound investment here requires also lowering or raising the tax on
domestic investment by U.S. companies.
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ment to the host country are surely substantial. Otherwise
nations and states would not compete as they do to attract
such capital. Ignoring the benefits of inbound investments
seems a major shortcoming of Musgrave's analysis as a basis
for policymaking.
Sixth, Musgrave fails to take into account potentially off-
setting or retaliatory actions by foreign governments. If, for
example, the United States were to follow Musgrave's "nation-
al neutrality" policy of allowing only a deduction for foreign
taxes, foreign governments also might decide to allow only a
deduction for U.S. taxes on their nationals' investments in the
United States. The policy of "national neutrality" would likely
then not only serve to inhibit outbound investment from the
United States but also would stifle inbound U.S. investment
from abroad. I find it very hard to believe that this state of
affairs would improve the economic status of Americans.
Ignoring potential responses of foreign governments to
changes in U.S. international tax policies also allows Musgrave
to disregard how foreign governments might react to her pre-
ferred policy of current taxation of foreign profits with an un-
limited credit for foreign taxes. Enactment of such a policy by
the United States could encourage foreign governments to
make sure that their tax rates on investments from the United
States at least equals the U.S. tax rate (if the FTC were limit-
ed) and to set rates higher if there were no FTC limitation.
U.S. multinationals would have no incentive to arrange their
affairs to minimize foreign taxes, a benefit from the perspec-
tive of global economic efficiency. But, even within Musgrave's
own framework, foreign taxes are simply a cost, from the per-
spective of the well-being of U.S. citizens and residents; substi-
tuting foreign tax payments for higher profits of U.S.-owned
companies is a net loss to U.S. persons. This means that from
the U.S. perspective, lower foreign taxes should be viewed as a
benefit, so long as locating profits in low-tax foreign jurisdic-
tions is not so attractive as to encourage companies to shift
investment income out of the United States. 2' This suggests
that the United States should be more vigilant in policing
corporate efforts to shift taxable profits away from the United
States than efforts to reallocate profits among foreign locations
121. See Hines, Reconsideration, supra note 80, at 400.
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to achieve tax savings. From the perspective of national wel-
fare, a certain level of avoidance of foreign taxes by both U.S.
multinationals and U.S. portfolio investors may be a good
thing.
Finally, Musgrave fails to take into account the possibility
of improving national welfare through cooperation with other
nations. Her failure to explore the potential for enhancing
national well-being through bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments is not troubling in evaluating Musgrave's recommen-
dations for achieving worldwide economic efficiency, where her
recommended unilateral action (CEN) is identical to her de-
sired multilateral outcome. But this omission raises serious
questions about her conclusions regarding "national neutrali-
ty," in particular, her assertion that the best policy from a
national perspective is to allow only a deduction for foreign
taxes."2
At least since the 1920's, the international tax policy of the
United States has been premised on the idea that we can im-
prove our lot through multilateral cooperation and agreement.
In 1918, we unilaterally took the first step toward relief from
double taxation of international income by rejecting our prior
policy of allowing only a deduction for foreign taxes and enact-
ing a foreign tax credit.' The policy we established then was
grounded in the view that international income should be
taxed once but not twice."M From that moment until this, we
have participated in, and in many instances led, efforts to
achieve similar results on a cooperative bilateral and multilat-
eral basis. In the 1920's, through the auspices of the League of
Nations (and subsequently through the United Nations and
OECD), we acted to obtain broad acceptance of the notion that
double taxation of income from foreign investments should be
alleviated either through foreign tax credits or exemption of
foreign source income." This has become standard policy
throughout the world.
All of the available evidence suggests that these policies
were pursued because U.S. policymakers regarded it as in our
nation's best interests, not because they had accepted the en-
122. Musgrave, U.S. Taxation, supra note 76, at 128, 134, 153, 162.
123. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
124. See Graetz & OHear, supra note 2, at 1043-44, 1048-49.
125. See id. at 1061 n.181, 1074-80.
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hancement of worldwide economic efficiency as the appropriate
policy norm." 6 Not all capital-exporting nations agreed that
crediting foreign income taxes or exempting foreign income
was to their benefit; the United Kingdom, for example, was
very slow to accept the idea that it should allow foreign tax
credits and did not enter into bilateral tax treaties until the
1940's.2
In addition to the economic benefits that our international
tax policy has produced, it also has served important U.S.
political interests as the United States became a world power,
both politically and economially after the First World War.
After the Second World War, international tax policy helped
facilitate U.S. private investments abroad in furtherance of our
nation's desires for the economic rebuilding of Europe and
Japan. By looking only at private rates of return and U.S. tax
collections to measure national welfare, economists fail to
count any political benefits.
In recent years, this multilateral income tax regime also
has facilitated foreign investments into the United States, as I
discussed earlier.
I find it difficult to believe that our national well-being,
Americans' standards of living, would have been improved with
the isolationist policy toward foreign investment implied by
allowing only a deduction for foreign taxes.'28 Put simply,
while I recognize the difficulties of measuring the effects of
international tax policy, indeed of tax policy generally, on na-
tional welfare, I reject the simple formula of "national neu-
trality" that suggests allowing only a deduction for foreign
taxes is the best policy if the goal is to enhance national, rath-
er than worldwide, welfare.
126. Id. at 1082.
127. Id. at 1072.
128. The Treasury Subpart F Study also generally analyzes the effects of inter-
national tax policy on national welfare from the national neutrality perspective of
Musgrave, but is careful to conclude only that it sees no reason to tax foreign
income at a rate lower than that applicable to domestic income, thereby not tak-
ing a position on the choice between a credit and deduction for foreign taxes to
maximize national welfare. Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 36-37, 41,
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C. Economic Efficiency as the Sole Value
The focus in the international income tax literature on
economic efficiency to the exclusion of all other values is anti-
thetical to the analysis of tax policy generally, and of income
tax policy especially. When assessing our domestic income tax
policy or arguing for any substantial change in that policy, the
debate generally is guided by a coherent, if controversial, set of
multiple principles. There is great dispute over the meaning of
these norms and about the priority to be accorded to each, but
since Adam Smith, it has been commonplace to say that a tax
system should be fair, economically efficient, and reasonably
easy to administer and comply with.
129
There has long been heated dispute over what constitutes
a fair system of taxation. The most vigorous policy debate
during the past 25 years has been over the choice between
income and consumption taxation, with the question whether it
would be fair to replace the income tax with a tax on consump-
tion the most contentious issue. Indeed, the decision to impose
an income tax in the first instance was grounded in consider-
ations of equity.3 ' Put somewhat crudely, the fundamental
claim is that income is a better measure of ability to pay than
the alternatives, notably consumption or wages.
Recently, the literature also has debated the validity of the
traditional division of analysis of a tax system's fairness into
horizontal and vertical equity components: requirements, re-
spectively, of similar treatment of persons or families similarly
situated and of a distribution of tax burdens based generally
on people's ability to pay.'31 Some commentators have sug-
gested that horizontal equity adds nothing.3 2 And there have
been longstanding disagreements both over how best to distin-
guish among people based on ability to pay and about the
necessity of a progressive distribution of the tax burden.'33 Of
129. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 945-47 (Regnery Publishing, Inc. ed. 1998) (1776).
130. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1043.
131. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 90-115,
160-83 (1959).
132. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Princi-
ple, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989). Cf. Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Hori-
zontal and Vertical Equity: The MusgravelKaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607
(1993). But see Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX
J. 113 (1990).
133. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Pro.
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late, these disagreements have been reflected in opposing
views over the appropriate mix of tax bases, including whether
fairness demands the taxation of income or wealth at all and
about the need for progressive tax rates."
The appropriate tradeoff between concerns for fairness, on
the one hand, and for economic efficiency, on the other, also
has long been hotly contested.135 But, however heated the ar-
guments on each side and uneasy the conclusions, claims that
fairness should be irrelevant in the formation of the nation's
tax policy or in evaluating or shaping the income tax are ex-
tremely rare.
The United States decided to make income taxes a central
feature of the U.S. tax system because the American people
were convinced that fairness demanded it. The Sixteenth
Amendment, adopted in 1913,36 permitting the taxation of
income, was motivated by a quest for equity, in particular by
the view that taxing investment income, as well as wages, was
essential to a fair system of taxation. 17 For more than eight
decades individual and corporate income taxes have produced
more than half the revenue of the federal government.
38
If economic efficiency were the sole goal of tax policy, we
would tax wages or consumption, but not income. Having de-
cided to impose an income tax, it is mysterious why concern for
fairness should disappear simply because goods or services or
labor or capital, have crossed national boundaries." 9
To the contrary, the original motivation for the unilateral
adoption by the United States of a foreign tax credit was
gressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952).
134. See, e.g., Graetz, U.S. Income Tax, supra note 58, chs. 13, 14, 15.
135. See, e.g., ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF
(1975).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
137. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1043.
138. MICHAEL J. GRATZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
PRINCIPLES & POLIcIES 16-17 (3d ed. 1995).
139. The Treasury Subpart F Study claims to treat concerns with fairness on a
par with concerns about economic efficiency. It finds these to be in perfect harmo-
ny by endorsing a policy of capital export neutrality on efficiency grounds and
claiming that fairness demands taxation of worldwide income on "the equitable
principle that the tax burden should be imposed equally on all income, without
regard to its source." Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 82. It then
notes that, "[a] more detailed analysis of equity concepts . . . is beyond the scope
of this study." Id. at 82-83 n.3. As the text that follows indicates, a number of
dimensions of equity are thereby left unexamined by Treasury.
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grounded in concerns for fairness. T.S. Adams, the fountain-
head of our system of international income taxation and re-
sponsible for the 1918 enactment of the FTC, expressed sur-
prise that it was adopted at all:
In the midst of war, when the financial burden upon the
United States was greater than it had ever been, I proposed
to the Congress that we should recognize the equities ... by
including in the federal income tax the so-called credit for
foreign taxes paid .... I had no notion.., that it would ever
receive serious consideration. 140
Adams explained the injustice he was trying to correct in the
classic language of horizontal equity:
There is something in the legislative mind which recognizes
that if one taxpayer is being taxed twice while the majority of
men similarly situated are being taxed only once, by the
same tax, something wrong or inequitable is being done
which, other things being equal, the legislator should correct
if he can."
The enactment of the foreign tax credit was intended to
ensure that the tax burden on investment and business income
did not become too high (labeled "double taxation") simply
because the income was earned abroad rather than in the
United States. The FTC also was advanced to ensure that
foreign source income of individuals and businesses not escape
taxation altogether.
Even T.S. Adams's principal intellectual adversary in mat-
ters of international tax policy, the influential economist
Edwin R.A. Seligman, who along with Sir Joseph Stamp of
Great Britain was the principal author and architect of a wide-
ly-cited report of "four economists" prepared in 1923 for the
League of Nations, "4 argued strongly in favor of giving prime
importance to considerations of fairness in taxing international
income.' As a policy matter, and contrary to Adams,
140. Thomas S. Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation,
22 NATL TAX Ass'N PROC. 193, 198 (1929) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
142. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1098-99, n.307.
143. Id. at 1074-75. The other two economists were Professor G.W.J. Bruins of
the Netherlands and Professor Luigi Einaudi of Italy.
144. Id.
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Seligman argued for granting exclusive power to tax to nations
where the supplier of capital resides.4 ' Seligman thought
little generally of the claims of source countries. He viewed
fairness as demanding that taxes based on ability to pay be
imposed on worldwide income, and he regarded it as a mistake
for capital-exporting residence countries to defer to source
countries by allowing a tax credit for foreign taxes. 46 Al-
though he emphasized the taxation of individuals in this re-
gard, Seligman also favored residence-country taxation of busi-
nesses, but not for the reasons of worldwide economic efficien-
cy advanced in its behalf today.47 In the early debates over
U.S. international income tax policy, T.S. Adams and Edwin
Seligman disagreed vigorously about what policy best satisfies
the requirement of fairness, but they did not disagree that
fairness was an essential attribute of international income
taxation.
D. Inter-nation Equity
The unlimited FTC, which was in place from 1918 until
1921, also offended Adams' sense of fairness. In this case,
however, he was concerned about fairness among nations rath-
er than taxpayers. He complained of a violation of what (due to
Peggy Musgrave 45 ) is now described as inter-nation equity:
[The unlimited FTC] is subject to this... rather grave abuse:
If foreign taxes are higher than our rate of taxes, that credit
may wipe out taxes which fairly belong to this country.'49
145. Id. at 1074-78.
146. See, e.g., Edwin R.A. Seligman, Untitled Response to Speech by T.S. Ad-
ams and Discussion, 8 AM. ECON. REV. 42 (Supp. 1918); see also E.R.A. Seligman,
Note on Sir Josiah Stamp's Note, transmitted on June 1, 1922, E.R.A. Seligman
Papers, Columbia University, box 44, United Nations folder (proposing a test of
"economic allegiance" for allocating taxes among nations).
147. Id.
148. Peggy B. Musgrave, International Tax Base Division and the Multinational
Corporation, 27 PUB. FIN. 394 (1972); Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave,
Internation-Equity, in MODERN FISCAL ISSUES 63 (Richard M. Bird & John F.
Head eds., 1972); see, e.g., Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of Inter-
national Income, 29 LAW & PoLY INT'L Bus. 145 (1998). Much of the international
tax policy literature, including governmental analyses (for example, the Treasury
Subpart F Study, supra note 30) contains no discussion of inter-nation equity.
149. Internal Revenue Act of 1921: Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate
Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 73 (1921) (emphasis added) (statement of Dr. T.S.
Adams, Tax Advisor, Treasury Dep't), in 95A INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE
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Here Adams' comment emphasizes the core entitlement of
the U.S. Treasury to the income tax revenues from domestic
production. His comment reflects the widespread view that
each nation has the right to tax income produced domestically,
a right routinely exercised through source-based taxation of in-
come, confirmed in the original League of Nations model in-
come tax treaties,15 ° and reconfirmed by the more than 1700
bilateral income tax treaties- now in effect. 5' The claim of
source countries to tax income produced within their borders is
analogous to a nation's long-recognized claim of sovereignty
over natural resources within its boundaries.'52
The idea that the source country has a fair claim to the
income produced within its borders is also grounded in the
view that foreigners, whose activities reach some minimum
threshold, should contribute to the costs of services provided by
the host government, including, for example, the costs of roads
and other infrastructure, police and fire protection, the system
for enforcement of laws, education, and the like. The services a
nation provides may contribute substantially to the ability of
both residents and foreigners to earn income there. Taxing
that income is one way for the source country to be compensat-
ed for its expenditures on the services it provides.'53 One
need not thoroughly embrace the benefit theory of taxa-
tion-the idea that the expenses of government should be paid
by those who benefit in proportion to the benefits they re-
ceive-which is fraught with difficult problems of measurement
and allocation, to recognize a country's legitimate claim to tax
income produced within its borders.
UNITED STATES 1909-1950: LEGISLATIvE HISTORIEs, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DOCUMENTS (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
150. See Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on
Double Taxation and Tax Erosion, League of Nations Doc. C.562. M.178. 1928 II
(1928).
151. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Sept. 20, 1996, art. VII, Tax
Treaties (CCH) 214 (reserving the right to tax business profits attributable to a
permanent establishment in the United States.)
152. The UN General Assembly has confirmed this right repeatedly. See, e.g.,
Tremors of World Financial Crisis Felt by Assembly, UN CHRONICLE, Mar. 22,
1999, at 53 (describing a resolution recognizing Palestinian sovereignty over natu-
ral resources in the occupied Palestinian territory).
153. The economic analyses routinely ignore the potential benefits financed by
taxes when they evaluate the economic efficiency of various international tax poli-
cies.
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In the consumption tax context, the widely-accepted gener-
al practice is to impose such taxes on a destination basis, in
other words to allocate the tax to the nation where the con-
sumption occurs. Although credit-method value-added taxes
are the common form of such consumption taxes, consumption
taxes may be imposed in a manner quite similar to income
taxes." The deep connections between consumption and in-
come taxes render the longstanding GATT distinction between
indirect and direct taxes archaic, if it was ever meaningful.'
Moreover, recognizing the links between income and consump-
tion taxes may suggest claims of inter-nation equity heretofore
largely unanalyzed, in particular claims to share in income
taxes by nations that supply a market for goods and services
produced elsewhere from capital supplied from other nations.
In other words, countries that supply only a market for goods
and services may have a claim to income tax revenues in com-
petition with those of both residence and source countries." 6
The important point for present purposes is that any claim
that is fair or just for a particular nation (or for nations gener-
ally) to obtain revenues from the productive activity that takes
place within its borders cannot be grounded in a norm of eco-
nomic efficiency. Indeed, such claims conflict with a central
feature of worldwide economic efficiency and capital export
neutrality, viz, indifference as to which nation collects the
taxes on international income. As has often been pointed out,
worldwide economic efficiency implies a policy solely of taxa-
tion by country where the suppliers of capital reside and no
taxation by the country where the income-producing activity is
conducted, the source country.'57 The virtually universal ex-
ercise by source countries of their right to tax income produced
154. E.g., Graetz, U.S. Income Tax, supra note 58, at 212-43; Alvin C. Warren,
Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under An Income Tax Is Exempt Under a
Cash Flow Tax, 52 TAX L. REV. 1 (1996).
155. Michael J. Graetz, International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Restructuring:
Practice or Principle?, 51 UNIV. OF MIAMI L. REv. 1093, 1097-98 (1997).
156. Such ideas may be implicit in calls for allocating international income tax
revenues to countries where consumption occurs. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 544-45 [herein-
after Electronic Commerce]; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition,
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1670-75 (2000)
[hereinafter Globalization].
157. See, e.g., Blueprints, supra note 30, at 89-90.
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within their borders is a rejection, as a practical matter, of the
worldwide efficiency norm.
E. Nondiscrimination and Reciprocity as Fairness-Based
Norms
Taking the demands of fairness seriously in the formation
and implementation of tax policy is always a daunting chal-
lenge, filled with controversy and inevitably subject to compro-
mise. Difficulties multiply in the international context where
new issues must be confronted. As I have indicated, the foreign
tax credit was a response to concerns about unfair "double
taxation" or unfairly burdensome taxation of income earned
internationally.'58 The income tax treaty requirement of non-
discrimination against foreigners was developed virtually si-
multaneously to guarantee fair treatment by the source coun-
try for foreigners and foreign businesses." 9 The fundamental
idea that everyone, including foreigners (once they are in the
country legally), is entitled to equal treatment before the law
(including the income tax law and tax treaties) is grounded in
concern for fairness and mutual respect. Whether the nondis-
crimination requirement of existing tax treaties also furthers
worldwide economic efficiency is, at most, a secondary consid-
eration. 60
The idea of fair play between sovereign people of different
nations also introduces a concern for "reciprocity" between
nations as an element in securing fairness or justice in inter-
national taxation. A requirement of "reciprocity" is familiar in
discussions of international relations, including international
tax policy.' I cannot discuss the idea in any detail here, but
I believe that ideas of fair play, of reciprocity, are quite useful
in explaining, for example, recent multilateral efforts to curb
"harmful tax competition."' In my view, the requirements of
158. See text accompanying notes 138-146.
159. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1068 (The 1921 resolutions of the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce, for example, would have required nondiscrimi-
nation among residents, citizens, and foreigners.)
160. E.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against Internation-
al Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131 (2001).
161. E.g., JOHN G. HERNDON, JR., RELIEF FROM INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXA-
TION: THE DEVELOPiENT OF INTERNATIONAL RECIPROCITY FOR THE PREVENTION OF
DOUBLE INCOME TAXATION (1932).
162. OECD, supra note 74.
[Vol. XXVI:41398
TAXING INTERNATIONAL INCOME
reciprocity may be more pronounced in cases of geographic
proximity and more attenuated between rich and poor nations
(such as those within and without the OECD).
F. Redistribution Among People of Different Nations
Achieving fairness in international income taxation is
complicated further by the question whether the use of the tax
law to redistribute income should stop at the nation's borders.
Interrogation of this question, so far, has been largely absent
from the international income tax literature, having generally
been left to political philosophers.'63 At a minimum, ques-
tions of international redistribution introduce two concerns:
first, the issue of a worldwide entitlement to a minimal level of
resources at least to prevent starvation, and perhaps malnutri-
tion; second, the question of whether rich nations have any
obligation to reduce misery to an "acceptable" level worldwide.
The responsibility of rich nations to ensure any baseline of
resources for all humanity is a controversial idea. And few
observers contend that our obligations to people abroad are
similar to those within our borders. As with efficiency, a na-
tional rather than worldwide perspective seems appropriate.
Concerns for the economic opportunities of foreigners, indeed
for their liberty, do not correspond to the commitment to equal
opportunity we aspire to at home. But accepting that the inter-
national obligations required by justice, or by simple humanity,
are less than those domestically does not render them nonexis-
tent.
If fairness demands some transfer of resources across
national borders, the question remains what role income taxa-
tion should play. Again, this is an issue that I cannot plumb
here, but to the extent that private investment has any sub-
stantial role to play in this regard, the taxation of capital in-
come may become a matter of central importance. To take but
one possibility, fairness between richer and poorer nations may
imply that rich nations should be net exporters of capital."M
163. See e.g., Rawls, supra note 60, at 115-19. But see Avi-Yonah, Globalization,
supra note 156, at 1648-50 (urging international redistribution as a basis for
source-based taxation).
164. This suggestion has been offered, among others, by Gary Hufbauer at a
conference at Brooklyn Law School in October, 2000. See Gary C. Hufbauer, Com-
mentary, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the Income of Foreign Controlled Corpora-
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This could suggest that the international tax policy of rich
nations should promote foreign investment, either generally
(for example, by deferring to source countries) or alternatively,
at least in less developed nations.165
G. Fairness for Corporations?
In the international context, one must ask how the de-
mands of fairness relate to the taxation of corporations. From
the time when the international income tax rules were first
formulated until quite recently, questions about international
income taxation were essentially questions about the taxation
of corporations, since corporations accounted for virtually all
international flows of capital. As Figure 2 shows, 166 the
growth of international portfolio investments both directly by
individuals and through financial intermediaries has changed
the international investment picture dramatically, but this is
quite a recent phenomenon.
We know that all taxes ultimately are borne by individu-
als, so that a requirement for fairness in taxation is properly
regarded fundamentally as a requirement of fairness among
individuals. The traditional tax fairness concepts of horizontal
and vertical equity have their primary salience when analyzing
tax burdens on individuals. Clearly vertical equity, distinguish-
ing among individuals based upon ability to pay, does not de-
mand the distinctions among corporations similar to those
among individuals. The income of a single corporation may be
owned by or attributable to individuals with markedly differ-
ent levels of income and different abilities to pay taxes.
The extensive studies in the 1990's by the ALI and the
Treasury of integration of the corporate and individual income
taxes have taught us that equivalent policies can be imple-
mented by changing taxation either at the corporate or share-
holder level.167 The ability to accomplish roughly equivalent
outcomes by granting corporations a deduction for dividends,
excluding dividends from shareholders' incomes, or granting
shareholders a credit for corporate taxes demonstrates this
tions, 26 BROOM J. INT'L L. 1555 (2001).
165. Tax policy, of course, would have to be coordinated with other policies
such as foreign policy and debt forgiveness.
166. See text accompanying note 10.
167. Graetz & Warren, supra note 97, at 18-20.
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point.'68 The principal disagreement between the two studies,
however, with the Treasury study favoring dividend exclusion
and the ALI study favoring the shareholder-credit method of
integration, essentially turned on a difference of opinion about
the demands of fairness-in particular, of vertical equity-in
the taxation of income earned by corporations.'69
When income is taxed only when realized, as it is every-
where, and the undistributed profits of corporations are not
attributed and taxed currently to shareholders, vertical equity
does, however, demand separate taxation of corporate income.
Otherwise, corporations will serve as tax shelters, a place for
people with capital to come together and avoid the individual
income tax. This is why a corporate tax is a necessary adjunct
to an individual income tax, and why many nations, including
ours, impose income taxes directly on corporations, although
with some uncertainty about just how this tax burden is trans-
ferred to individuals. 7 ° Most economists believe a corporate
income tax principally burdens owners of capital, and if this is
true, the corporate tax plays an important role in the alloca-
tion of tax burdens between labor and capital income.'7 ' In
my view, in a classical corporate tax system, vertical equity
also suggests that the corporate income tax rate be reasonably
close to the top individual marginal rate, although others dis-
agree. 72
168. Id.
169. Beginning in the 1970's, many nations, including most countries in Eu-
rope, moved toward a partially integrated corporate and individual income tax
system through shareholder credits for some portion of corporate income taxes. But
in recent years, apparently due to concerns with the taxation of international
income, some of these countries-notably, Australia, Germany, and the United
Kingdom-have retreated back toward a classical corporate income tax system.
170. Most economists now regard an income tax on corporations as a tax on
capital income, borne by suppliers of capital, but the burden of actual corporate
income taxes, at least in part, may be borne by consumers and/or workers. It is
standard practice in government analyses either to assume the U.S. corporate
income tax is split 50-50 by owners of capital and consumers or to treat the inci-
dence of the tax as uncertain.
171. Let us not forget, however, that an unintegrated corporate tax imposes an
excess burden on new equity investments in corporations. See generally Graetz &
Warren, supra note 97.
172. The first time I met Boris Bittker, nearly 30 years ago, at a conference at
the University of Miami, he was commenting on a paper by Norman Ture railing
against the very existence of a tax on corporate income. In Bittkers wry style he
pointed out that Ture's paper indicated he was delivering it on behalf of Norman
B. Ture, Inc. Bittker remarked that he was certain that Ture had not incorporated
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The challenge for U.S. tax policy is to maintain a close
proximity between the top individual tax rate, the corporate
tax rate, and the tax rates of other developed nations. As I
have argued in detail elsewhere, accomplishing all these tasks
offers support for initiating a 10%-15% value-added tax to fi-
nance an income tax exemption of about $100,000 for families
and a reduction in both the corporate and top individual in-
come tax rate to 25%.173
From the inception of the individual income tax, U.S.
policymakers have been concerned with the use of foreign cor-
porations to undermine the vertical equity of the individual
income tax structure. Such concerng also motivated the enact-
ment of the foreign personal holding company rules in
1938'7 and (along with horizontal equity concerns) the PFIC
regime added nearly five decades later in 1986.' Thus, equi-
ty (in addition to concerns about economic efficiency) offers a
reason for us to be concerned about foreign source income of
corporations (as well as of individuals) escaping both U.S. and
foreign income tax.
While the issues are not nearly as straightforward as with
vertical equity, I also believe that horizontal equity-the re-
quirement of similar treatment of taxpayers similarly situat-
ed-has a role to play in the taxation of corporate income. The
metaphor here, frequently advanced by both business represen-
tatives and members of Congress, is the "level playing field."
To be sure, the idea of a "level playing field" (like the idea of
"double taxation") and exactly what it means for tax policy are
far from self-evident. We should be wary not to personify cor-
porations simply because we treat them as "legal persons," or,
in the language of the Code, "taxpayers." Nor, on the other
hand, should we ignore the importance to justice of equal
treatment before the law.
because of his need to access the capital markets but rather because the corporate
tax could be an opportunity as well as a burden. In those days the corporate tax
provided two opportunities to reduce individual taxes: through greater pension
benefits than unincorporated businesses and a substantially lower tax rate on
income accumulated at the corporate level.
173. Graetz, U.S. Income Tax, supra note 58, at 262-66, 293-314.
174. Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1937).
175. H.R. Rep. No. 99-841, at 11-641, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 4) 641; S.
Rep. No. 99-313, at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 3) 37.
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As I have suggested, I regard the familiar requirement of
"nondiscrimination" in international tax law (and its cousin
"national treatment" in international law more broadly) as
grounded in concerns for fairness, rather than economic effi-
ciency. Many areas of the tax law incorporate the idea that
horizontal equity-or "nondiscrimination" if you pre-
fer-demands equal treatment of corporations in identical
circumstances. For example in 1932, when shifting from an
overall foreign tax credit limitation to a per-country limitation,
the House Ways and Means Committee expressed its concern
about companies earning foreign source income in countries
with no income tax (or with a rate significantly lower than the
U.S. rate) in the language of horizontal equity. Using as an
example two companies operating in Argentina, the Committee
complained about "preferential treatment to some taxpayers
deriving income from more than one foreign country," and
explicitly suggested that fairness demanded equal treatment of
the Argentine income.'76 The Committee was silent about any
tax-based incentives for Argentine investments. Today, in con-
trast, most analysis of the choice between per-country and
overall tax credit limitations is typically about the relative
effects of these limitations on capital export neutrality.17
To be sure, economists are concerned with the inefficien-
cies that might result, but inefficiencies-tax-motivated chang-
es in investment location decisions, for example-will occur
only if disparities are apparent before the relevant conduct, the
decision to invest, occurs. But inequities may occur even in the
absence of inefficiencies, for example, when two companies in
identical circumstances are treated differently by the country
where the investment is made after the relevant investments
have been made or other relevant transactions have been con-
summated. To be sure, the real economic unfairness, if any,
will fall on the individuals who bear the economic burdens of
176. H.R. Rep. No. 72-708, at 23-24 (1932); see also William P. McClure &
Herman B. Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income From 1909 to 1989: How a
Tilted Playing Field Developed, 43 TAx NOTES 1379, 1382 (June 12, 1989).
177. See, e.g., Andrew B. Lyon & Mathew Haag, Optimality of the Foreign Tax
Credit System: Separate vs. Overall Limitations, mimeo, January 2000, available at
http:J/www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/Lyon; Andrew B. Lyon & Mathew Haag, Capital
Export Neutrality and the Optimal Foreign Tax Credit System, Nat'l Tax Ass'n,
Proceedings of the 93rd Annual Conference (2000), forthcoming NAT'L TAX J.
(2001).
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the corporate-level tax. But, because the legal issues are re-
solved at the corporate level, the corporations are entitled to
equal treatment before the law. Fairness-fair play-requires
it.
Indeed (although this comment surely will seem heresy to
many of my economist and lawyer friends in the academy)
claims on behalf of adopting policies of both CEN and CIN
seem to contain claims about fairness. As I described earlier,
Edwin Seligman's support for equal treatment of foreign and
domestic source income (CEN) was explicitly grounded in fair-
ness claims-both horizontal and vertical equity-rather than
economic efficiency.' 8 And in a December 2000 study, Trea-
sury describes President Kennedy's urging the Congress in
1962 to adopt a policy of capital export neutrality as grounded
in concerns for fairness, in this case equal treatment of domes-
tic and foreign income earned by U.S. multinational compa-
nies.' 9 Likewise, while "competitiveness" is the rallying cry
of the business community on its behalf, CIN's demand of
equal treatment of income earned within a nation's borders,
whether earned by citizens or foreigners (or a corporation
owned by nationals or foreigners) may, in substantial part, be
motivated by fairness concerns. Consider the following state-
ment, which is typically characterized as a requirement of
capital import neutrality, but which also suggests nondiscrimi-
nation and national treatment: All investments in the United
States should pay the same taxes regardless of whether a U.S.
person (company) or foreign person (company) makes the in-
vestment. In other words, U.S. and foreign-owned business and
investments in the United States should be treated equal-
ly.8 ' While potential economic inefficiencies are the primary
concern of advocates of CEN and CIN, issues of fairness are
implicated in this criterion as well.
A few years back, the topic du jour of international tax
policy was the allegedly low level of taxes paid to the United
States by foreign-owned businesses doing business in the Unit-
178. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
179. Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at 82-83, also claims that fair-
ness demands equal taxation of domestic and foreign income; see also supra note
21.
180. This may be one reason why the OECD limited its definition of harmful
tax competition to "ring-fencing," a limitation that cannot be explained by any
reference to economic efficiency. OECD, supra note 74, at 27.
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ed States. President Clinton ran for office in 1992 claiming he
could raise $45 billion by equalizing the taxes of foreign- and
U.S.-owned businesses, although after he was elected Presi-
dent the number had dwindled to less than 10% of that
amount, 8' but the public had been stirred. About the same
time, Sam Donaldson devoted a segment of his prime-time TV
show to the low level of taxes being paid to Treasury by Japa-
nese-owned companies.'82 Neither Clinton nor Donaldson ex-
pressed concern with the potential misallocation of capital
caused by a low level of tax on foreign companies doing busi-
ness in the United States. Even if they uttered the phrase
"competitive advantage," they were beating the drums of fair-
ness.
It is, in fact, not entirely self-evident what business repre-
sentatives mean when they complain of a "competitive advan-
tage" enjoyed, say by a French company not subject to tax in
its home country on an investment in a third country with a
low income tax rate, when the United States would impose
additional income tax on a similar investment by a U.S. com-
pany-" Business representatives simply may be asserting
that they will have to charge more for their products under the
view that at least some part of the corporate tax is passed on
to consumers in prices. Alternatively, they may be concerned
that the additional U.S. tax burden increases their cost of
capital relative to that of the French company-in the rhetoric
of business, that the U.S. company faces a higher "hurdle"
rate. Or they may be urging both effects. They are surely also
claiming that it is unfair to require their company to pay more
taxes simply because it is incorporated in the United States
rather than abroad. One may or may not credit such claims,
but for my point here all that matters is that the competitive
advantage claim asserts unfairness, even if it is also about tax-
induced distortions to economic decisionmaking.
181. Michael J. Graetz, Tax Policy at the Beginning of the Clinton Administra-
tion, 10 YALE J. REG. 561, 567 (1993).
182. Primetime Live: No Yen for Taxes (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 9,
1992).
183. Such a difference in taxes may occur because France often imposes no tax
on investment abroad, under circumstances where the United States may collect
residual tax, for example, due to the foreign tax credit rules or subpart F.
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H. Summary of Discussion of Fairness
To be sure, thinking about fairness in international taxa-
tion complicates both analysis and policymaking. It is frequent-
ly controversial even in the domestic context to achieve agree-
ment about the appropriate level or redistributive goals of the
income tax, or to assess under what circumstances equity de-
mands equal treatment. When the relevant comparisons are
between citizens, residents, and foreigners, the difficulties
multiply. Multinational corporations add further complications
and controversy. Questions of the appropriate measurement of
the tax base and level of tax also become more complex when
income is earned transnationally. What, for example, consti-
tutes "double taxation" and at what levels is it unfair? What is
the proper role and scope of a rpquirement of nondiscrimina-
tion?
In the international context, we must also pay attention to
questions of fairness among nations. Each nation's claims of
entitlement to share in the income of its residents as well as
income produced within its borders-and the circumstances
under which nations are willing to forgo their share-must be
taken into account. Reciprocity has both substantive and proce-
dural dimensions. Unilateral actions by sovereign nations often
must be given force and responded to, but some level of inter-
national coordination and cooperation is essential.
But, despite the difficulties, deciding to tax income reflects
a decision to place issues of fairness at the heart of tax policy
debates. That commitment cannot be ignored simply because
income traverses national borders. As with domestic income
taxation, a quest for economic efficiency can never be more
than a partial explanation for international tax policy deci-
sions. As one economist put it: 'Everything is economics, but
economics is not everything.""
184. Sijbren Cnossen, Must the Corporation Tax be Harmonized?, in TAXATION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: THEORY AND PRAcTIcE 191 (Anthonie
Knoester ed., 1993); see also PETER A. HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME
TAXATION AND ALLOCATING TAXING RIGHTS BETWEEN CoUNTRIEs 46 (1996) (quoting
Cnossen, supra).
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I. Foreign Policy and International Taxation
So far, I have argued that basing U.S. international in-
come tax policy solely on the principle of worldwide economic
efficiency is wrong both because it fails to give adequate priori-
ty to the goals and interests of the American people and omits
from consideration important demands of fairness, of justice.
But the process of international tax policymaking is further
complicated by other considerations, including foreign policy.
For the well-being of its citizens and residents, the U.S.
government necessarily takes into account, through its foreign
policies, circumstances elsewhere in the world. This nation's
attitudes and policies toward other nations depend on econom-
ic, political, and social relationships, as well as our history.
History, for example, best explains our current relationship
with the Philippines. Our alliances for defense constitute a
classic example of U.S. foreign policy at work. Another exam-
ple is U.S. actions to affect the flow of foreign oil. Sometimes
we act simply out of altruism.
Foreign policy concerns have long played an important role
in U.S. international tax policy. In 1921 Congress enacted a
special exemption for businesses operating in U.S. possessions
to encourage economic development there." That law be-
came the model for the special tax advantages enacted in 1942
for Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations.' In 1922 Con-
gress passed the China Trade Act, which adopted a complicat-
ed structure providing benefits to "China Trade Corporations"
to stimulate investments in China by U.S. corporations. 7 In
1950 the U.S. permitted oil-exporting countries to base their
income tax on posted prices, a move intended both to encour-
age foreign investments by U.S. oil companies and to transfer
U.S. revenues to oil-producing nations.'
This nation's post-war policies of using both public and
private capital to rebuild the economies of Europe and Japan
prompted a number of changes in U.S. international tax rules
following World War II, including rules governing the calcula-
tion of the limitation on the foreign tax credit. Encouraging in-
185. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 262, 42 Stat. 227, 271.
186. IRC § 109 (1942).
187. China Trade Act of 1922, § 26, 42 Stat. 856.
188. Bergsten et al., supra note 50, at 168.
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vestments abroad by U.S. corporations and individuals was
intended not only to stimulate economic development in coun-
tries devastated by the war, but also to spread capitalism and
democracy through economic interdependencies and political
alliances.'89 Similar goals have been advanced more recently
for U.S. investments in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, and China.
In 1962, Congress enacted subpart F rules favoring invest-
ments in developing countries. 90 Today almost one-third of
the stock of U.S. outbound foreign direct investment is in de-
veloping countries.' 9'
The income tax also has denied foreign tax credits for
companies participating in a boycott of Israel'92 and investing
in South Africa during apartheid.'93 The former was enacted
to express our distaste for the boycott and to reaffirm this
nation's special relationship with Israel. In the latter case,
humanitarian concerns of U.S. citizens provided a national
interest in discouraging private investments in South Africa.
There are many other potential uses of international tax
policy to advance U.S. foreign policy. In the late 1970's, for
example, when keeping the supply of mideast oil flowing head-
ed the U.S. foreign policy agenda, some analysts suggested
that U.S. oil companies should be entering into management
service contracts with oil-producing nations rather than mak-
ing equity investments.9 To achieve such an outcome, U.S.
policymakers could have readily fashioned international tax
rules to favor management contracts and disfavor equity in-
vestments. Instances where government should make these
kinds of distinctions may be rare, but when they are warrant-
ed, international income tax laws may facilitate the desired
policies.
Likewise, if we were to take redistribution internationally
as an appropriate function of international tax policy, distinc-
tions among priorities for such redistribution surely would be
influenced by foreign policy. For example, we might limit the
189. For a good summary of U.S. post-war policy, see id. at 309.
190. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1008; id.
at 356.
191. UN Report, supra note 9, at 147.
192. IRC §§ 908(a), 999.
193. IRC § 901(j); Rev. Rul. 90-53, 1990-2 C.B. 343.
194. The example is from Bergsten, et al., supra note 50, at 160-64.
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foreign tax credit in a way to encourage investment of U.S.
capital abroad in countries that are "appropriate" objects of
redistribution. If, for example, we concluded that South Africa
and Russia-for quite different reasons-are now appropriate
objects for redistribution, we might treat "competition" by such
countries for investments of private U.S. capital as "benign,"
not "harmful." We then might exempt from U.S. tax income
earned in these countries or allow deemed foreign tax credits
for taxes not imposed by those nations. We might also encour-
age, rather than discourage, transfer pricing to shift income
(and thereby tax revenues) to those countries. Other countries,
such as Iraq for example, would not be treated favorably, as it
is not a place to which we want to redistribute assets (for well-
known foreign policy reasons).
Some of the tax rules enacted for foreign policy reasons
have worked reasonably well, others poorly, but surely this
would also be true of other means of implementing foreign
policy, including government spending and direct regulation of
foreign investments. It is a legitimate concern that the tax law
promote the foreign policy of the nation, not just the foreign
policies of U.S. business, but this is no reason to forgo using
tax law as a way to implement U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, tax
policy may be a superior instrument of foreign policy when
stimulating or inhibiting investments of private U.S. capital or
transfers of technology or other knowledge to another country
is important to this nation's foreign policy interests. Only the
view that the tax law is always a bad way to do things other
than raise revenue -the perspective of tax-expenditure reli-
gionists-would rule out the tax law as an implement of U.S.
foreign policy.
In assessing the role of international tax policy as an in-
strument of U.S. foreign policy, we should keep in mind the
relative inadequacy and costliness of other foreign policy op-
tions, including economic sanctions, military blockades, and
war. In many instances cutting off (or increasing) foreign aid
might serve as well or better than changes in international tax
rules, but such tinkering may not be a viable policy option,
given the relatively small size of current U.S. foreign aid.'95
195. In 1997, for example, the total U.S. foreign aid budget was $12.3 billion.
Foreign Operations and Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations
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Moreover, using direct foreign aid as a stimulus to change the
domestic policies of another nation might be regarded by third-
party nations as more intrusive on their sovereignty than lim-
iting (or enhancing) tax advantages for private investments.
One need not believe that what is good for U.S.-based multina-
tionals is good for the United States, nor that U.S.-based mul-
tinationals will always act consistently with U.S. foreign poli-
cy, to accept a role for international tax policy as an instru-
ment of U.S. foreign policy.
Foreign policy objectives may influence decisions about
which countries to enter or cancel tax treaties with and the
appropriate parameters of treaty concessions. The procedure
for ratifying tax treaties confirms the legitimate role of foreign
policy objectives in international taxation. Like other U.S.
treaties, tax treaties are within the jurisdiction of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. The exclusion of the House of
Representatives altogether from the tax treatymaking process
contrasts sharply with the constitutional priority given that
body in tax lawmaking generally and tends to support the idea
that tax treaties are connected to foreign policy as well as to
tax policy generally.
The essential point is this: The advantages (or disadvan-
tages) of foreign investments by U.S. citizens and companies
may be political as well as economic. Evaluating U.S. interna-
tional tax policy by a metric such as worldwide economic effi-
ciency, which looks only to rates of return and tax dollars col-
lected and fails to take into account political benefits and bur-
dens of foreign investments, is a mistake.
J. Compliance Costs and Administrability
Even when treated as a separate goal, rather than just a
facet of economic efficiency, simplicity always seems to be the
forgotten stepchild of income tax policy. Routinely lip service is
offered to the- idea that the tax law ought to be as simple to
comply with and administer as possible; then, after a nod and
a wink, vaulting complexity overleaps itself. Analyzing interna-
Act, 1997, H.R. 3540, 104th Cong. (1997). In contrast, foreign tax credits claimed
by businesses and individuals on their 1997 tax returns totaled nearly $29 billion,
more than twice as much. IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL. 170 tbl. 1, 184 tbl.
13 (Winter 2000-2001).
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tional tax policy solely through the competing lenses of CEN
and CIN relegates simplicity to a footnote.
But wasting valuable resources through unnecessary costs
of complying with a complex tax law is economically inefficient.
And the Service cannot fairly administer a law its personnel
cannot comprehend. Only cursory contact with the details of
U.S. international income tax rules confirms their overwhelm-
ing complexity. The economists Marsha Blumenthal and Joel
Slemrod have estimated that nearly 40% of the income tax
compliance costs of U.S. multinationals are attributable to the
taxation of foreign source income, even though foreign opera-
tions account for only about 20% of these companies' economic
activity.
196
In addition, each year more and more individuals have
investments in mutual funds that purchase securities in for-
eign countries. The number of taxpayers claiming foreign tax
credits on individual tax returns has increased more than ten-
fold from 234,000 in 1975 to 2,334,000 in 1997.197 The aver-
age foreign tax credits claimed on the returns of individuals
with incomes of less than $100,000-60.2% of the total-is
$339.19' This trend seems likely to accelerate. The complexity
that claiming FTCs on portfolio investments adds to individual
returns is not warranted by any offsetting policy consideration.
The time has come to make simplification of international
tax rules a priority. We can simplify without being simplistic:
Complex international business transactions and investment
arrangements cannot be governed by a simple law, but there is
no justification for the level of complexity U.S. individuals,
businesses, their advisors, and the Service now confront.
K. International Cooperation and Conformity
Conformity with international practices sometimes is ad-
vanced as an independent principle for making international
income tax policy.9 9 This I think is a mistake. As I have
196. Marsha Blumenthal & Joel B. Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of Taxing
Foreign-Source Income: Its Magnitude, Determinants, and Policy Implications, 2
INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 37 (1995).
197. Jeff Curry, Maureen Keenan Kahr & Sarah E. Nutter, Individual Foreign-
Earned Income and Foreign Tax Credit, 1996, 19 STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL. 1,
130 (Summer 1999).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Rosanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Defer-
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said, I believe the United States should shape its international
tax policy to serve the best interests of the nation, broadly
defined. A wide range of principles must be taken into account,
including what is fair, economically efficient, reasonably simple
to comply with and administer, and advances the nation's
foreign policy interests.
Often our national interests can be enhanced through
international cooperation, cooperation that also may produce
gains for other nations. And when a cooperative solution
proves impossible or impractical, our national interests may
best be promoted by bringing our rules into closer conformity
with those of foreign countries. The flexibility that companies
enjoy in determining the source of income and their country of
residence may mean that the international tax policies and
rules of other nations may constrain our ability to depart dra-
matically from international practice and still achieve our
policy goals. This constraint may be especially important as a
practical matter in taxing income from direct investments by
corporations.
Because the developed countries account for more than
two-thirds of the world's inward direct investment, more than
90% of the world's outward direct investment, and also the
bulk of inbound and outbound portfolio investments, these
nations comprise the most significant universe for seeking
cooperation and perhaps conformity."' But the developing
countries have recently become more important, accounting for
37% of global inflows in 1997, compared to just 17% in
1990.01 This no doubt reflects the increasing mobility of capi-
tal and perhaps lower income tax rates in some developing
countries. It makes clear the need to include developing na-
tions both in multilateral policy discussions and as bilateral
tax treaty partners. Whatever one thinks about the substance
of the OECD efforts to combat what it has labeled "harmful tax
competition," its effort to introduce non-OECD nations into
OECD policy discussions should be applauded.
Caution, however, is warranted in assuming that conform-
ing our nation's tax system with that of other nations, even
ral, 87 TAx NOTES 255 (Apr. 10, 2000); Treasury Report on Subpart F, supra note
30, at viii.
200. UN Report, supra note 9, at xviii.
201. Id.
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developed nations with effective income taxes, will inevitably
improve our national welfare. International harmonization of
tax systems, like other changes in policy, will tend to produce
winners and losers. Recent evidence, for example, suggests
that European harmonization of capital income taxes might
increase the welfare of citizens and residents of the United
Kingdom, while producing large outflows of capital and signifi-
cant diminution of tax avenues and welfare in the nations of
continental Europe.202
National interests and social, economic, and political con-
ditions vary from country to country, often along important
dimensions. International conformity and cooperation therefore
should never be an end in itself and need not serve generally
as a bedrock principle informing U.S. international tax
policymaking. Rather, cooperation and sometimes conformity
are properly regarded as possible means to achieve improve-
ment of our national welfare and the development of a simpler
and more just tax system
L. Enforceability
Collectability is an essential attribute of any tax. Enacting
rules that cannot be enforced is pointless. In the international
tax arena, considerations of enforceability have always shaped
the law and always will. Source-based taxation of income, for
example, has long been justified, at least in part, on the
ground that the country of source is in the best position to
collect income tax.203
Direct and portfolio investments pose different challenges
for income tax enforcement. Modernization of tax administra-
tion and certain aspects of the income tax law are, however,
essential in both cases. For direct investment, today's task is to
insist upon adequate information and to modernize longstand-
ing income tax concepts that have become outdated as transna-
tional business has modernized and transformed. (I review
some of these outdated concepts in Section II.) In the case of
portfolio investment, the largest problem seems to be outright
202. ENRIQUE G. MENDOZA, THE INTERNATIONAL MACROEONOMIcS OF TAxATION
AND THE CASE AGAINST EUROPEAN TAX HARMONIZATION (NBER Working Paper
8217), available at http//papers.nber.orgpapersw8217.
203. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1056-59.
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evasion; taxpayers too often simply do not report income
earned abroad.
Underreporting of transnational portfolio income is appar-
ently quite substantial. For example, in March, 1994, the U.S.
Treasury, for the first time in 50 years, conducted a compre-
hensive survey. of outbound portfolio investments from the
United States." 4 As a result of this survey, the Department
of Commerce revised its 1993 estimates of portfolio interest up-
ward by $6.1 billion, from $17.2 billion to $23.3 billion, and its
estimate of portfolio dividends upward by $4.1 billion, from
$6.8 to $10.9 billion.205 A similar 1997 Treasury survey re-
duced the reported U.S. balance of payments deficit by more
than $10 billion due to increased interest and dividends re-
ceived by U.S. residents from foreign securities. 26 The 1993
estimate of U.S. holdings of portfolio stock was increased from
$302.8 billion to $543.9 billion.0 7 The magnitude of these ad-
justments suggests massive gaps in tax reporting of interest,
dividends, and capital gains.
The Treasury surveys of foreign portfolio holdings by U.S.
citizens and residents were part of an internationally coordi-
nated effort of 29 countries under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, undertaken because reported worldwide
liabilities held by foreigners greatly exceeded reported foreign
assets.0 8 Most industrialized nations participated in the sur-
204. U.S. TREASURY DEP', 1994 BENCHMARK SURVEY OF U.S. OWNERSHIP OF
FOREIGN SECURITIES (1998); see also U.S. TREASURY DEPT, REPORT ON U.S. HOLD-
INGS OF FOREIGN LONG-TERM SECURITIES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND DECEM-
BER 31, 1999, at I (Apr. 2000).
205. Christopher I. Bach, U.S. International Transactions, Revised Estimates for
1974-96, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (1997).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, RESULTS OF THE 1997 COORDINATED
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT SURVEY (Jan. 31, 2000). =FB[ILL REQUESTED] =FN The
Treasury surveys were conducted first in March 1994, again in 1997, and planned
for every three to five years thereafter as a joint project of the Treasury Depart-
ment and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. In addition to data from
the Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting system, which requires monthly
reporting of all major purchases and sales of foreign securities on a monthly basis
(but which has significantly undermeasured U.S. holdings), surveys were made of
all custodians of securities (including those where foreign branches of U.S. finan-
cial service companies hold the securities). Detailed data was collected from indi-
viduals only when they did not entrust their securities to a U.S. custodian. U.S.
investors who hold more than $20 million of foreign securities were surveyed, with
the bulk of assets reported by those who pool assets for investment, such as man-
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veys.209
The success of the Treasury surveys in uncovering many
billions of dollars of interest and dividend income and holdings
of foreign securities offers considerable encouragement about
the ability to use information reporting requirements to assist
tax enforcement. This new information about aggregate portfo-
Ho investments abroad essentially resulted from summing
information discovered and accumulated about individual in-
vestments.
When source-based countries forgo imposing income tax,
as so many now do, for example, with portfolio interest, other
enforcement mechanisms become essential. Over the past three
decades, the United States has demonstrated the power of
information reporting in lieu of withholding in improving the
collection of income taxes on domestic interest, dividends, and
capital gains. A cooperative multilateral information-reporting
effort might prove quite fruitful in improving enforcement of
residence-country taxes on portfolio income.
The agreement by the countries of the European Union to
expand information reporting of cross-border income flows is
an encouraging development.210 It demonstrates the willing-
ness of countries to collaborate to limit tax evasion, even when
they are unwilling to impose low-rate withholding taxes, as
had been long urged by E.U. officials.21' And, despite the
gaps in coverage, it shows both the potential benefits and ne-
cessity of international cooperation in improving tax enforce-
ment. Although U.S. portfolio investments are widespread
throughout the world, two-thirds of such investment is in 10
countries, with five countries (the United Kingdom, Canada,
agers of mutual funds, insurance companies, and pension funds.
209. See U.S. Treasury Report, supra note 204, at 1, for a list of countries.
210. At a meeting of EU finance ministers in Brussels, 12 of the 15 EU coun-
tries agreed to exchange information to combat tax evasion. The other
three-Luxembourg, Austria, and Belgium-agreed to impose a 15% withholding
tax on interest paid to nonresidents from other EU countries. Tom Buerkle, EU
Resolves Dispute over Tax Evasion, INVL HERALD TRIBUNE (Nov. 28, 2000), avail-
able at www.iht.com/articlesl2728.html. Some observers, including Reuven Avi-
Yonah, for example, regard withholding as essential. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,
supra note 156, at 1578.
211. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive to Ensure a Minimum of
Effective Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments Within the
Community, COM (1998) 295 final.
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Japan, the Netherlands, and Germany) attracting more than
$100 billion each of such investments.212
The European move toward more information reporting,
especially in- the face of the bank secrecy laws of certain mem-
ber countries, offers an important policy opportunity for the
United States. In the 1980's, when this nation was anxious for
foreign purchases of U.S. debt in order to help finance federal
deficits, Congress repealed our withholding tax on portfolio
interest and allowed bearer bonds to be issued to foreign-
ers."'3 As a result, the U.S. government is currently unable to
provide other countries with any information about the owners
of these bonds. To protect against tax evasion by U.S. resi-
dents, however, these bonds contain a stamp indicating that
they may not be sold to U.S. persons. Of course, the Eurobond
market also provides bearer bonds, so that U.S. persons who
want bearer bonds (without paying withholding taxes) may
purchase bonds abroad. Today, fiscal surpluses are permitting
the federal government to reduce the national debt held by the
public, and national economic policy seems likely to produce an
ongoing reduction of such debt in the years ahead. Since com-
bating tax evasion on portfolio investment is clearly in our
national interest (and in the interest of the European nations),
the time seems ripe to seek a multilateral agreement eliminat-
ing bearer bonds and simultaneously otherwise improving
mechanisms for information exchange on portfolio investments
(especially when no substantial withholding tax is collected at
source).
As the next Section illustrates, however, we should not be
misled into believing that solving the problems of enforcing
international income tax rules is simply a matter of greater
cooperation, of more and better exchanges of information. To-
day, the mobility of capital and technological innovations pose
substantial challenges for collecting income taxes, challenges
that can be addressed only by modernizing archaic core con-
cepts for enforcing the international taxation of business in-
come.
212. U.S. Treasury Report, supra note 204.
213. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127, 98 Stat. 494, 648
(1984).
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III. OUTDATED CONCEPTS
As I suggested earlier, in the case of direct investment,
many of the core concepts designed to enforce international
income tax arrangements have become outdated. These funda-
mental rules for accomplishing and enforcing international tax
policy were put in place during the formative period-1918
through 1928-for international income taxation, a time when
the world economy was very different. Recent years have wit-
nessed, for example, the rise of e-commerce, the expanded use
of financial derivatives, the invention of e-money, the increased
mobility of capital, and a rise in the use of tax-haven financial
centers and more sophisticated cross-border legal and financial
arbitrage, all of which have helped render archaic (or easily
manipulated) the longstanding core concepts used worldwide to
implement international income tax arrangements and poli-
cies.214 International income tax law is now composed of legal
concepts and constructs that no longer reflect the economic
realities of international business, if they ever did. The contin-
uing insistence of the international tax regime in treating
different divisions of an integrated multinational business as
separate entities, whenever their legal status implies such
separation, is but one illustration of the problem."5 Legal
constructs, which are largely elective and easily manipulated,
play too great a role in determining international tax conse-
quences of business arrangements. I treat this subject only
very briefly here. These issues have been treated at length
elsewhere in the international tax literature, and many of the
key concepts are the regular grist of meetings and conferences
of international tax professionals. Some have moved to the top
of the agenda of OECD working groups. Thus, the comments
that follow sketch only the outlines of a rather deep iceberg. I
limit my comments to the fundamental concepts of source of
income and residence of taxpayers, the basic building blocks
for measuring income and allocating tax revenues among coun-
tries. Discussion of these (and related) issues in the interna-
tional tax literature-much like the reluctance to move away
214. Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments and the Work of
Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOM J. INT'L L. 1261 (2001).
215. H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the Income of Foreign
Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1525 (2001).
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from reliance on CEN as the sole normative goal of interna-
tional tax policy-reflects a resistance to surrendering the
existing concepts and categories. That these rules have served
reasonably well in the past makes the international tax com-
munity reluctant to consider abandoning or even
reconceptualizing the existing concepts and categories. Ulti-
mately, however, this may be exactly what is required.
A. Rules for Determining the Source of Income
New forms of doing business and flexibility in fashioning
transactions to determine the characterization of income today
threaten to undermine the basic rules for determining the
source of various categories of income. Readily manipulated
distinctions, for example, between sales and licenses or inter-
est and rents, play a critical rule in the allocation and taxation
of international income. In the late 1970's, the American Law
Institute conducted a thoroughgoing review of the source rules
and concluded that, while a bit of tinkering might improve
things, all was reasonably well.216 Rereading the excellent
work of the ALI today underscores just how fast and funda-
mental have been the changes in the ways companies do busi-
ness. For example, recently, a number of commentators have
suggested that the use of financial derivatives has rendered
the ALI's judgment obsolete.217 Reconsideration of the source
rules for business and portfolio interest, dividends, capital
gains, and related derivative income is necessary in light of
recent financial developments.
Moreover, many of the basic source rules themselves turn
on the legal nature of a transaction rather than its economic
substance. 18 Examples include distinctions between sales
and licenses and between rents on a financial lease and inter-
est. In addition, a number of source rules turn simply on the
216. ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECt INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INCOME TAXATION (PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON UNIT-
ED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF UNIT-
ED STATES PERSONS) (1978).
217. Jeffrey M. Col6n, Financial Products and Source Basis Taxation: U.S.
International Tax Policy at the Crosssroads, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 775; Gregory
May, Flying on Instruments: Synthetic Investments and Withholding Tax Avoidance,
73 TAX NOTES 1225 (Dec. 9, 1996).
218. Hugh Ault and David Bradford have suggested that source is only a legal
concept, not an economic one. See Ault & Bradford, supra note 34, at 12.
1418 [Vol. XXVI:4
TAXING INTERNATIONAL INCOME
residence of the payor, and as the subsequent subsection
shows, corporate residence today is itself a problematic catego-
ry. Finally, source rules sometimes are used to promote a par-
ticular kind of economic activity; the U.S. rules for determining
the source of income from products manufactured in the Unit-
ed States and sold abroad are an example.219
If the source rules are to serve as a way of allocating in-
come equitably among nations and enhancing national econom-
ic well-being and/or fairness among taxpayers, they should be
overhauled to be better linked to the location of real economic
activity, the location of customers, workers, or assets.22 ° Mov-
ing in this direction demands that greater attention be given to
the economic role of intangible assets. Valuing such assets is,
of course, not practical and their allocation to various locations
tends to be illusory. Sales may reflect the value of many cus-
tomer-based intangibles and labor costs may reflect workforce-
in-place intangibles, but the location of research and develop-
ment also must be taken into account for such rules to reflect
reasonably the real economic activity underlying the produc-
tion of income. The need to redesign source rules to connect
better to real economic activity is linked to recent efforts to
shore up the rules designed to protect against the manipula-
tion of the source of income through transfer prices among
related companies.
Much of the attention of international tax policymakers in
the past decade, indeed of the past three, has focused on diffi-
culties in enforcing the requirement that related-company
prices be equivalent to those that would occur in arm's-length
transitions between unrelated companies. Many have ques-
tioned whether arm's-length pricing is the theoretically appro-
priate way to allocate profits jointly produced, but whatever its
theoretical merits, arm's-length allocation, which was intro-
duced in the 1920's by the League of Nations22' has always
been a difficult fiction to enforce. Determining a related-compa-
ny price for the right to use intangible assets and proprietary
219. See U.S. TREASURY DEPT, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE SALES
SOURCE RULES (1993).
220. For further development and analysis of the ideas in this section, see
David Noren, Commentary, 54 TAX L. REV. - (forthcoming 2001).
221. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION, Doc. E.F.S. 73 F. 19
(1923).
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knowledge has become increasingly more difficult and hotly
contested as an increasing proportion of intercompany trans-
fers have come to involve intangibles, such as technology appli-
cations and know-how, which are rarely, if ever, transferred to
an unrelated third party except when an entire business or
line of business is sold. After many fits and starts in recent
years over the substantive rules, as well as the procedures for
determining such prices and the penalties for making "mis-
takes," the international tax community, including most first-
world governments, the OECD, and many businesses, now
seem to be embracing the fairy tale that the transfer-pricing
problem is pretty much under control."22 This, however, is no
doubt only a temporary lull until the next round of transfer
pricing abuses captures the attention of Congress or other
policymakers.
The major alternative to the arm's-length pricing fiction is
apportionment of income among related companies based on a
formula turning on sales, labor costs, or assets, or some combi-
nation of those three plus perhaps a fourth factor relating to
research and development expenditures. Despite the genuine
economic importance to the production of income of assets,
sales, and labor, experience with formulary apportionment in
U.S. state income taxes is not encouraging.2" Because differ-
ent states' formulas weigh the factors differently, typically to
the advantage of the local treasury, some income is taxed more
than once by multiple jurisdictions, although some income may
escape taxation altogether.
Formulary apportionment was considered and rejected by
the League of Nations in 1927 and 1928, principally because
tinkering with the variety of methods of apportionment then in
place throughout the world would have upset the fragile com-
promise that permitted the League to issue the model income
tax treaties of 1928.2" In 1976 formulary apportionment
222. The rules sometimes rely on adjusting income periodically based on actual
income. See generally OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (1995).
223. Charles E. McLure, Jr., U.S. Federal Use of Formula Apportionment to
Tax Income From Intangibles, 14 TAX NOTES INT'L 859 (Mar. 10, 1997), and litera-
ture cited therein; Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Joann M. Weiner, Deciding Whether
the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of Company Income, in
TAXING CAPITAL IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Sijbren Cnossen ed.) (forthcoming).
224. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1086-89.
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passed the U.S. Senate but was not accepted by the conference
committee. Formulary apportionment remains a potential solu-
tion to transfer pricing difficulties. I am not aware, however, of
any serious attempt to develop a formulary system for interna-
tional income taxation on a revenue neutral basis for the Unit-
ed States and its major trading partners, nor am I aware of a
formulary recommendation that gives appropriate weight to
the role of intangible assets in producing income. While not
easy, such an effort should now be made in conjunction with
exploring the potential use of such formulas (or other profit-
splitting techniques) as a basis for determining the source of
business income more generally.
22 5
Finally, the "permanent establishment" concept, which has
served reasonably well since the 1920's to- set the threshold for
countries to impose source-based taxation of business income,
is also facing new pressures, from electronic commerce, new
financial techniques, and new forms of business arrangements
and combinations. Litigated controversies seem to be increas-
ing. Some commentators have offered proposals for revising the
permanent establishment idea, while others would abandon it
altogether.226 Some minimum threshold of business activity
necessarily must be required as a prerequisite to source-based
taxation of business income. At a minimum, modernization of
the permanent establishment concept seems essential. It is
also worth exploring whether a threshold amount of sales,
assets, labor, or research and development within a nation
could better serve to establish both the source of business
income and as a threshold for the imposition of tax. Indeed,
multilateral agreement to impose source-based taxation on a
uniform formulary apportionment of sales, assets, R & D, and
labor costs might eliminate the need for the permanent estab-
lishment concept altogether.
225. See, e.g., Noren, supra note 220.
226. See, e.g., RICHARD L. DOERNBERG & Luc HINNEKENS, ELECTRONIC COM-
MERCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1999); OECD, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RESEARCH AGENDA
(1999); Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 156, at 535; Frances M. Hor-
ner & Jeffrey Owens, Tax and the Web: New Technology, Old Problems, 50 BULL.
INTVL FIsc. Doc. 516, 517 (1996); CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., ALTERNATIVES TO THE
CONCEPT OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT (forthcoming); Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints,
and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269, 417 (1997).
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B. Corporate Residence
Analyses of the taxation of international income, particu-
larly discussions that would ground such taxation in a norm of
worldwide economic efficiency (or CEN) not only typically in-
sist on the primacy of taxation of the worldwide income of the
nation's residents, but also often proceed as if the idea of resi-
dence is obvious and self-enforcing.. In the case of corporations,
however, the idea of residence-an idea central to any discus-
sion of principles and policies relating to international taxation
of foreign direct investment-seems both outdated and unsta-
ble.
One basic difficulty is jurisdictional. The United States, for
example, has no claim to tax foreign persons on their foreign
source income, but asserts jurisdiction to tax U.S. persons on
income earned anywhere in the world. Thus, the residence of a
corporation becomes critical for determining whether the Unit-
ed States has jurisdiction to tax its foreign source income. In
addition, there are a number of instances when the source of
income is determined by reference to residence, for example,
where the source of income turns on the residence of a corpo-
rate payor" 7
A tax regime based on residence or nationality can be
somewhat difficult to implement in the case of individuals, as
recent efforts to curb tax-motivated shedding of U.S. citizen-
ship have demonstrated."8 But in the case of corporations,
the idea of residence is largely an effort to put flesh into fic-
tion, to find economic and political substance in a world occu-
pied by legal niceties. It is no accident that we call corpora-
tions doing business around the world "multinationals."
The separate legal status and taxation of corporations has
long been a feature of U.S. law.229 The 20th century corporate
income tax predates the modern individual income tax. The
Code treats corporations organized in the United States under
federal or state law as U.S. persons." 9 This allows companies
considerable flexibility whether to subject their business opera-
227. See, e.g., § 861(a)(1) (interest); § 861(a)(2) (dividends).
228. IRC §§ 877, 2107, 2501(a)(3).
229. See Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at app. H (containing a
history). Only the income tax in place briefly during the Civil War attributed the
income of corporations to its owners. Id. at 102.
230. IRC §§ 7701(a)(4), (a)(5).
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tions abroad to residence-based taxation in the United States.
Other nations sometimes look to more than the simple act of
incorporation-for example, to the place of actual manage-
men9---in determining residence of corporations, but flexi-
bility in establishing a corporation's residence is a universal
phenomenon.
The chore of limiting such flexibility to impose residence-
based taxes fills many pages of the Code, regulations, and tax
treaties. In general, the thrust of these efforts is to impose
residence-based taxation whenever the foreign corporation is
substantially owned or controlled by U.S. persons (including
other corporations)., 2 In the case of multinational corpora-
tions, this means that major tax consequences turn on whether
the parent corporation is a U.S. or foreign entity.
Perhaps there was a time when national identity exerted
sufficient pull that a corporation controlled by U.S. individuals
would find incorporation of the parent entity elsewhere un-
thinkable, but that time seems to have passed. The choice of a
German parent in the Daimler-Chrysler merger, which was at
least partially driven by tax considerations, is the most publi-
cized and scrutinized example." 3 But the use of Bermuda-
based parents of such companies as Global Crossing and Tyco
may be at least equally threatening to U.S. residence-based
corporate taxation. In March 2000, Lindy Paull, Chief of Staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation, and Jonathan Talisman,
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy, expressed concern
to Congress about the legal loophole that allowed property and
casualty insurers to stop paying income taxes simply by mov-
ing the parent corporation to Bermuda.234 Senator Daniel
231. JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN
TAXPAYERS AND FOREIGN INCOME 83 (1990).
232. See, e.g., Richard L. Reinhold, What is Tax Treaty Abuse? (Is Treaty Shop-
ping an Outdated Concept?), 53 TAX LAW. 663 (2000).
233. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, June 30, 1999
(statement of John H. Loffredo, Vice President and Chief Tax Counsel,
DaimlerChrysler Corp.), available in 1999 TNT 126-47, Jul. 1, 1999, LEXIS, TNT
File. Among the tax considerations at issue apparently were the German rules re-
garding corporate expatriations, which might have resulted in large capital gains
taxes if a U.S. company were the parent. Some commentators have suggested that
the U.S. subpart F rules were also an important factor. Albertina M. Fernandez,
The US Deferral Privilege: Should Subpart F be Repealed? 86 TAX NOTES 1055
(Feb. 21, 2000).
234. Hearings of the Senate Finance Committee, Mar. 8, 2000, available in
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Moynihan, then the ranking Democrat on the committee, al-
ways one to see broader implications, wondered aloud whether
"we are entering an era of corporate expatriation" with compa-
nies moving their headquarters overseas to avoid taxes." 5
Additional flexibility in determining corporate status and
residence was ushered in a few years ago with the "check-the-
box" regulations. 6 As the furor over Notice 98-11" 7 and its
progeny dramatically illustrated, the check-the-box develop-
ment has produced much debate over the extent to which and
when the United States should be concerned with techniques
for reduction of foreign income taxes by U.S.-owned foreign
entities.
Likewise, efforts to distinguish "real" corporate residents
from false claimants when nationals of third countries seek to
take advantage of benefits of bilateral income tax treaties have
spawned a variety of "limitation on benefits" or "treaty shop-
ping" clauses since the 1970's. 8 These clauses attempt to re-
strict the benefits of tax treaties to corporations (or other enti-
ties) that are owned, at least in substantial part, by residents
of the treaty country. 9
Treasury also has issued regulations that limit the ability
of U.S. corporations to expatriate tax free, but tax-free mergers
with and acquisitions by foreign entities generally are permit-
ted. ° I cannot review the relevant rules here, but they seem
to have something of a finger-in-the-dike quality about them.
In any event, permitting corporate expatriations only through
mergers is not obviously wise policy. Companies and their
advisors have developed a number of techniques to minimize
the "exit tax" that may be imposed when a taxable expatriation
occurs, techniques that may render Treasury's regulations
2000 TNT 52-28, Mar. 16, 2000, LEXIS, TNT File.
235. Id.
236. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3; see generally, Treasury Subpart F Study, supra
note 30, at 68-70.
237. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433.
238. See Reinhold, supra note 232, at 664.
239. U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 151, art. 22, Tax Treaties (CCH) 214.
240. Reg. § 1.367; see generally Robert J. Staffaroni, Size Matters: Section
367(a) and Acquisitions of U.S. Corporations by Foreign Corporations, 52 TAX LAW.
523 (1994); Willard B. Taylor, Corporate Expatriations-Why Not?, 78 TAXES 146
(2000); David R. Tillinghast, Recent Developments in International Mergers, Acquisi-
tions and Restructurings, 72 TAXES 1061 (1994).
1424 [Vol. XXVI:4
TAXING INTERNATIONAL INCOME
largely ineffective." 1 Start-up companies, which expect to
earn foreign source income, are completely free to choose their
residence (although in many instances the ability to use start-
up losses against other U.S. source income may argue for a
U.S. residence).
A number of commentators have suggested that the recent
evidence that corporations prefer a foreign residence implies a
need to reexamine whether the U.S. international tax law has
become unduly inhospitable to corporate headquarters and
incorporation.12 Business representatives have urged a reex-
amination of subpart F on similar grounds.2"
It is precarious to turn significant U.S. tax consequences
on the status of a corporation as a resident or nonresident,
given the difficulty of assessing the "true" residence of corpora-
tions, except in the case of closely-held companies where the
residence of the owners easily can be determined. Linking
corporate residence to the residence of its owners simply does
not seem practical in the context of multitiered multinationals.
On the other hand, insisting that a corporation's residence is
the same as that of its managers or officers seems difficult to
justify.
The fragility and manipulability of the residence of corpo-
rations suggests to me that U.S. international tax policy, to the
extent possible, should reduce the tax consequences of determi-
nations of residence for corporations. There are several policy
implications that flow from this judgment. First and foremost,
it implies priority of taxation of business income at source. In
the case of corporations, we probably should stop talking as if
our policy is worldwide taxation of corporate residents and as
if any departure from such policy, such as taxing active busi-
ness income of foreign corporations only when repatriated, is
an aberration.2
In the case of direct investment, the need to collect tax on
U.S. source corporate income deserves emphasis, and
policymakers should focus on techniques for deflecting such
241. Taylor, supra note 240, at 149-52.
242. See, e.g., id. at 146.
243. See, e.g., NFTC Foreign Income Project, supra note 41, % 57; cf. Treasury
Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at vii.
244. For a good example of such talk, see generally Treasury Subpart F Study,
supra note 30, at x.
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income, including the deflection of passive and mobile income
to other countries, as well as erosion of the U.S. tax base
through deductible payments. In today's economy, accomplish-
ing these tasks is Herculean. We should try to minimize the
tax consequences that turn on a corporation's "residence." This
necessarily would put additional pressure on determinations of
source, and make the linkage of such determinations to the
location of real economic activity (the locations of sales, labor,
property, and research and development), as suggested in the
previous Section, even more pressing.
IV. UNSATISFACTORY POLICY
Adherents of CEN have clear policy priorities: They would
eliminate "deferral," taxation by the United States of active
business income of foreign corporations controlled by U.S.
corporations or persons when repatriated to the United States
rather than when earned. As I have indicated, elimination of
deferral was proposed to Congress in 1962 by President Kenne-
dy, suggested again in December 2000 by Treasury (along with
reliance on CEN as a basis for U.S. international tax policy),
and frequently endorsed by other CEN proponents. 5 On the
other hand, support for the other two policy changes implied
by CEN-elimination of cross-crediting of foreign taxes and
repeal of the foreign tax credit limitation-is scarce. The for-
mer is regarded as impractical (although the 1986 Tax Reform
Act's basket system might be regarded as a move in the direc-
tion of CEN); the latter unwise. No one urges an unlimited
foreign tax credit, both because it would undermine the ability
of the United States to collect taxes on U.S. source income and
invite other nations to impose high taxes on U.S. companies as
a way to shift revenues from our treasury to theirs. Although
CEN advocates insist that their policy is "worldwide" taxation
of residents," a "pure" CEN policy is not in the cards.
Enthusiasts of CIN, on the other hand, endorse a territori-
al system of international income taxation, a system that
would grant the exclusive power to tax income to countries of
245. See, e.g., text accompanying note 45; Treasury Subpart F Study, supra
note 30, at 87; Peroni, supra note 37, at 977, 986-94; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious about Curtailing Deferral of U.S.
Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455 (1999).
246. E.g., Treasury Subpart F Study, supra note 30, at ix-xi.
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source, with no tax on income earned abroad by countries
where the suppliers of capital reside. But, although about one-
half of the OECD countries exempt from tax at least some
foreign active business income,24 nations with substantial
capital exports routinely retain residence taxation of passive
and portfolio income.
Viewed through the twin lenses of CEN and CIN, U.S.
international tax policies (and those of our major trading part-
ners) can reasonably be described as a "compromise," and, as I
have stressed earlier," a "compromise" between CEN and
CIN can justify virtually any policy outcome. Debating CEN
versus CIN as a guide to international tax policymaking is a
dead end. We need to change the conversation about interna-
tional tax policy, and take a fresh look at our international tax
rules. And in doing so, we should avoid fruitless policy debates
where one side insists that any departure from worldwide
taxation of U.S. residents, including corporate residents, is an
unfortunate violation of CEN, while the other side demands
that only territorial taxation of income will implement CIN.
Instead, we can now ask the straightforward, but difficult
to answer, question: What international tax policy is in the
best interests of the people of the United States, taking into
account political as well as economic considerations, and the
demands of fairness as well as of efficiency, recognizing that
nations believe that they have rights (or at a minimum, fair
claims) to the tax revenues attributable to the economic activi-
ties that take place within their borders, and keeping in mind
that the United States is now a large importer, as well as
exporter, of capital? We should minimize the costs of compli-
ance and administration and acknowledge that an unenforce-
able tax can be neither efficient nor fair.
Providing policy answers to this question inevitably will be
difficult and controversial. First, disputes will occur over what
policies the norms imply-over what fairness, for example,
demands-as well as about the priorities and appropriate
trade-offs among the norms when they entail conflicting poli-
cies. In my view, fairness considerations merit priority in the
247. E.g., OECD, TAXING PROFITS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: DOMESTIC AND IN-
TERNATIONAL IsSUES 183 (1991).
248. See text accompanying notes 35-57.
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taxation of individuals, while concern for our national economic
well-being should enjoy primacy in taxing corporation business
income. Second, the consequences of alternative policies re-
main uncertain. We simply do not have adequate factual
knowledge to make confident predictions about the effects of
different policies. But both of these circumstances-normative
disputes and empirical uncertainty-are commonplace condi-
tions of tax policymaking. Asking the right questions will nev-
ertheless improve policy debates and potentially produce better
law.
Before turning to some specific policy suggestions, let me
illustrate how changing the question can change the policy
analysis. First, how should we think about the avoidance of
foreign taxes by U.S. multinational corporations? 9 As I have
discussed, if the goal is to maximize worldwide economic effi-
ciency, there is no difference between foreign and U.S. taxes.
On the other hand, in terms of our national welfare, U.S. taxes
finance goods and services for the use of U.S. citizens and
residents, but foreign taxes are simply costs, which (net of any
specific benefits they purchase for U.S. citizens and residents)
reduce the economic wherewithal of the U.S. persons who pay
them.
From the perspective of CEN, which abhors tax-induced
distortions in the location of investments, any tax-induced shift
in the allocation of resources is bad, whether the culprit is U.S.
or foreign taxes. In contrast, from the perspective of national
welfare, we may be indifferent about the avoidance of foreign
taxes due to a shift in resources from one foreign country to
another. Indeed, paper transactions to reduce foreign taxes, as
opposed to shifts in real economic resources, should increase
our national welfare, at least until techniques for foreign tax
avoidance stimulate owners of capital to locate assets abroad
rather than in the United States. Thus, for example, when
foreign taxes can be reduced simply by "checking the box," the
United States may benefit so long as this ability does not
cause U.S. resources to move offshore. In contrast, if one views
CEN as the fundamental ground for policymaking (either for
249. For the purpose of this discussion, I simply assume that the parent corpo-
ration is owned and managed by U.S. individuals and managed and incorporated
in the United States.
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reasons of economic efficiency or fairness), any ability to reduce
foreign taxes is problematic.
From the perspective I am urging here, the essential diffi-
culty is empirical. A number of economists have demonstrated,
for example, that business decisions, including the location of
productive activities, are sensitive to tax burdens, but we do
not know at what level tax differentials will stimulate individ-
uals and businesses to move their capital or labor abroadY
Second, consider the distinction between direct invest-
ments by corporations and portfolio investments by individu-
als. Capital export neutrality implies identical policies for both:
taxation by the residence country only, or alternatively, cur-
rent taxation of worldwide income with an unlimited per item
foreign tax credit for taxes levied by source countries. But
recasting the international tax policy questions the way I have
urged here implies a sharp distinction between the taxation of
foreign direct investments of multinational corporations and
foreign portfolio investments of individuals. With regard to the
former, the impact on our economic well-being occurring from
both outbound and inbound investments is primary; foreign
policy and other political considerations also may be important;
issues of fairness are secondary. On the other hand, in taxing
individuals' foreign portfolio investments, issues of fairness
take on greater importance.
Moreover, the reasons for investing abroad tend to be
different in the two cases. Portfolio investors seek diversifica-
tion and higher rates of return. Portfolio capital is considerably
more mobile than direct investment and its liquidity often
makes it quite volatile, as it was during the Asian, Latin
American, and Mexican economic crises in the 1990's."5' Di-
rect investments, in contrast, typically are made by corpora-
tions when the company's ownership-specific advantages, such
as proprietary know-how or technologies, compensate for the
additional costs of establishing facilities in a foreign country
and for any disadvantages of the firm vis-a-vis local competi-
tors, and when the company enjoys greater benefits from ex-
ploiting such ownership advantages internally rather than
250. See, for example, the sources cited at note 13.
251. See UN Report, supra note 9, at 14-16.
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contracting with unrelated third parties." 2 Foreign direct in-
vestment typically involves a long-term commitment to a busi-
ness endeavor in a foreign countryY
3
The claims of source countries to tax the income also seem
different in the two cases. Direct investment seems more likely
to impose costs on the host country and to benefit from host
country governmental expenditures than does portfolio invest-
ment. Thus, the source country's claim to tax income seems
stronger with direct investment.
The analysis I have offered here thus suggests that inter-
national tax policy toward foreign direct investments by corpo-
rations and foreign portfolio investments of individuals should
be determined separately, recognizing the crucial need (and
difficulty) to establish and police the boundaries between
them. 4 I shall now explore briefly some policy proposals
that should be seriously examined for direct and portfolio in-
vestments. In advancing these policy ideas, I am not now urg-
ing adoption of the ideas that I shall discuss. My effort here is
preliminary, and more work is needed both to estimate the
consequences of such policy changes and to detail the rules
needed for their implementation.
I assume here that any changes I discuss can be adopted
on a revenue neutral basis. Thus, for example, if changes in
the taxation of outbound foreign direct investment would in-
crease U.S. corporate revenues, corporate tax rates could be
reduced. 5 This means that the suggestions that follow need
not affect the relative tax burdens of labor and capital income.
A. Inbound Investment
As I mentioned earlier, the principal determinants of how
attractive the United States is to direct investments from
abroad relate to nontax economic conditions, such as our flexi-
ble labor marketsY6 In terms of tax policy, foreign corpora-
252. See id. at 89; Dunning, supra note 92 at 79-80.
253. See World Investment Report, supra note 101, at 90.
254. One trick in drawing such a distinction will be in providing appropriate
rules for venture capital investments abroad, a topic that has barely made it onto
the international tax policy radar screen.
255. Or other offsetting changes could be enacted. For example, the rule that
limits foreign tax credits for the corporate alternative minimum tax could be re-
pealed or revised.
256. See text accompanying note 27.
1430 [Vol. XXVI:4
TAXING INTERNATIONAL INCOME
tions are treated similarly to domestic corporations so the U.S.
corporate income tax also plays an important role. I have de-
tailed elsewhere my own ideas for U.S. tax reform, which
would lower the U.S. corporate tax rate to 25%." The chang-
es I recommend--enacting a 10-15% value-added tax to finance
a $100,000 per family exemption from the individual income
tax and reduction of both the top individual and corporate tax
rates to 25%--would enhance the attractiveness of the United
States as a location for foreign investments. I have also long
supported integration of the corporate and individual income
taxes, which many industrial nations have embraced but some
now seem to be retreating from." "
As I have stated previously, in my view, the nation with a
primary claim to the taxation of active business income is the
host country, the country of source. Thus,, from the perspective
of the United States, I would emphasize the collection of taxes
on U.S. source business income, whether earned by foreigners
or residents. As I suggested in the preceding section, effective
source-country taxation now seems to require substantial
changes in numerous international tax concepts, such as those
dealing with transfer pricing, permanent establishments, and
income effectively connected to a U.S. business, as well as the
more general rules for determining the source of various cate-
gories of income."
With regard to portfolio investments into the United
States from abroad, the major attraction is a strong U.S. econ-
omy and stock market. The general tax reform I have de-
scribed above should be a positive factor in that regard. In the
case of portfolio investments, principally for reasons relating to
national welfare and fairness discussed more fully in Section C
below, I regard the principal claim to taxation to be that of the
residence country. And I endorse our treaty policies of reducing
(or eliminating) withholding taxes. As I have discussed earlier,
the problem of evasion of taxes on portfolio income is serious,
and the United States should join a multilateral effort to en-
hance information reporting of portfolio income. Such an effort
obviously will require the United States to be a supplier as
257. Graetz, U.S. Income Tax, supra note 58, at 303-14.
258. See generally Graetz & Warren, supra note 97.
259. See text accompanying notes 178-203.
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well as a recipient of information, so I recommend the elimina-
tion- of bearer bonds for sale to foreigners. If that deflects a
certain amount of portfolio investment elsewhere, it is a price
worth paying.
B. Foreign Direct Investment
As I noted earlier, CEN enthusiasts from time to time
have endeavored to tax currently the income of foreign corpora-
tions controlled by U.S. persons or companies, thereby revers-
ing the longstanding U.S. policy of taxing foreign active busi-
ness income only when repatriated. 6 ° In my view, however,
none has yet made a convincing case that this would increase
the well-being of U.S. citizens and residents. My concern is
that the principal effect of such a shift in U.S. policy to a sub-
stantially more burdensome policy followed by none of our
major trading partners-a significant departure from inter-
national practice-would be to encourage incorporation of busi-
nesses outside the United States and efforts to move U.S. cor-
porate residents abroad.26' Making the United States a less
hospitable place for corporate incorporation, headquarters, or
management does not seem likely to enhance our national wel-
fare.
In contrast, because of the dominance of CEN as a basis
for U.S. international tax policymadng, political leaders have
given little attention to the potential benefits of moving toward
an exemption system. Any movement away from foreign tax
credits toward exemption has been viewed as abandoning CEN
in favor of CIN. We have been paralyzed by fear of abandoning
taxation of "worldwide income" in favor of a "territorial" sys-
tem. In practice, however, exemption systems used by other
nations and our foreign tax credit system are quite close.262
And U.S. companies with excess foreign tax credits essentially
enjoy exemption on any additional marginal foreign source
income. The right question to ask is whether we, as a nation,
would be better served by explicitly exempting from U.S. tax
some specific categories of foreign direct income.
260. See text accompanying notes 18-19.
261. See text accompanying notes 190-203 for a discussion of the
insubstantiality of our rules regarding corporate residence.
262. See HUGH J. AULT, COMPARATIVE INcOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANAL-
YSIS 381-82 (1997).
1432 [Vol. XXVI:4
TAXING INTERNATIONAL INCOME
A number of other industrial countries, including, for ex-
ample, France and the Netherlands, exempt foreign source
active business income from tax.26 Indeed, about one-half of
OECD countries have some type of exemption system, while
the other half use foreign tax credits.2s
From time to time, analysts have suggested that the U.S.
system of international taxation and U.S. economic welfare
could be substantially improved by moving to an exemption
system.265 A recent paper co-authored by a leading interna-
tional economist at Treasury suggests that moving to an ex-
emption system, with appropriate anti-abuse rules, could both
increase U.S. revenues and improve economic efficiency.266
Moreover, there is credible economic evidence that exempting
foreign source active business income would not precipitate
any substantial outflow of capital from the United States.6 7
The greatest potential simplification of our system for
taxing international income could be achieved by exempting all
foreign source income. But the risks of such a change to the
nation's economic well-being may be too great. Such a broad
exemption would create a substantial incentive to move mobile
capital and portfolio abroad, creating an unacceptable risk to
both the U.S. Treasury and U.S. residents. Exempting divi-
dends from active business income, however, may not entail
such significant risks, and surely an exemption for income
earned in countries with real income taxes imposed at tax
rates roughly comparable to the U.S. rate would pose no such
threat. A presidential task force in 1971 proposed an elective
exemption from U.S. taxation of income derived from the active
conduct of a trade or business by U.S. corporations and their
263. Id. at 384-85.
264. E.g., OECD, note 247, at 183.
265. See, e.g., Terrence R. Chorvat, Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business
Income, ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000); HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MUTTI, DIvi-
DEND EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM FOR TAXING FOREIGN BUSINESS IN-
CoME (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Tax Law Review); Hufbauer,
supra note 94, at 135-36. Not enough detailed work on how an exemption system
would work in the United States has been done to assess the validity of these
assertions.
266. See Grubert & Mutti, supra note 265.
267. ROSEANNE ALTSHULER & HARRY GRUBERT, WHERE WILL THEY GO IF WE
GO TERRITORIAL? DIVIDEND EXEMPTION AND THE LOCATION DECISIONS OF U.S.
CORPORATIONS (paper prepared for Brookings Institution International Tax Policy
Forum Conference on Territorial Income Taxation, Washington, D.C., Apr. 2001).
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foreign subsidiaries and branches in countries where the tax
rate is sufficiently high to produce tax credits that would large-
ly offset U.S. tax liabilities (that is, where the foreign rate is at
least 75% of the U.S. rate).268
Some proponents of exemption have claimed great simplifi-
cation advantages for an exemption system, and an exemption
of all active business income earned abroad does seem to offer
much potential for simplification. Under a system that exempts
foreign business income only in countries with comparable
income taxes, important simplification benefits might also
occur for companies operating almost exclusively in countries
with-tax rates roughly comparable to ours. Such an exemption
would cover income earned in the vast majority of countries
where substantial, active business income is earned by U.S.
companies. But further work is needed to assess the simplifica-
tion potential of this more limited exemption system.
In such an exemption system, we would need to retain
rules to distinguish foreign and domestic source income and to
separate active business income from passive income. Anti-
abuse rules along the lines of subpart F and the foreign per-
sonal holding company rules also would have to be retained.
Look-through rules would be necessary to protect against
mischaracterization of income and source. If exemption were
limited to active business income from relatively high tax coun-
tries, we also would have to maintain a foreign tax credit re-
gime for income not eligible for exemption, although such a for-
eign tax credit could be considerably simpler than the one we
now employ, since companies would have excess foreign tax
credit limitations, and there would be no need to provide rules
to deal with excess credit situations. We could greatly simplify
or eliminate the basket system, for example, and substantially
simplify the rules for allocating deductions, such as for taxes,
interest, and research and development between foreign and
domestic sources. Transitional issues of moving to an exemp-
tion system also would have to be addressed.
The essential task today-as it has been since the foreign
tax credit was first enacted nearly nine decades ago-is to
prevent double taxation of income earned abroad, while also
268. BUSINESS TAXATION: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
BUSINESS TAXATION 44 (1970).
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guarding against foreign source income going untaxed any-
where. 69 Double taxation would inhibit U.S. citizens and
companies from making productive investments abroad, while
zero taxation might unduly tempt them to shift investments
away from the United States."' Surely these goals can be ac-
complished at lower cost and with less complexity than today's
law. The current rules for taxing foreign source business in-
come are unduly complex. They impose unnecessary costs of
compliance on businesses and are difficult, if not impossible,
for the Service to enforce in an evenhanded manner. A number
of proposals have been offered for simplification of the U.S.
rules for taxing foreign source income."' But, we also should
investigate seriously the advantages and disadvantages of
replacing the foreign tax credit with an exemption of active
source business income or at least an exemption of such in-
come earned in countries with tax rates comparable to ours.
The U.S. business community is split on the question of
exempting foreign source income. Whether a company supports
or opposes exemption tends to turn on what proportion of its
foreign source income is due to royalties or interest (which
could be subject to increased U.S. taxes under an exemption
system). Nevertheless, we should take a hard look at exempt-
ing from U.S. tax foreign source direct income from the conduct
of an active foreign business (perhaps limited to treaty coun-
tries or countries with income taxes comparable to ours) to
determine whether the simplification and economic advantages
claimed on its behalf could be realized.
C. Foreign Portfolio Income of Individuals
The amount of portfolio income-interest, dividends, and
capital gains-earned by U.S. individuals from foreign sources
has increased dramatically in recent years. Some of these in-
vestments are made by individuals directly, but much of the
recent increase is through mutual fund investments. Pension
funds, tax exempt organizations, and 401(k) plans also earn a
269. See Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 2, at 1033, 1038-39.
270. At least since the 1930s, for example, special rules have been required to
inhibit the movement offshore of passive income and portfolio assets.
271. E.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 130 (1996); David R. Tillinghast, Inter-
national Tax Simplification, 8 AM. J. OF TAX POLY 187 (1990).
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significant amount of foreign portfolio income. As I indicated
earlier, such investments generally are made to achieve diver-
sification and a higher rate of return, and they tend to substi-
tute for domestic investment, thereby conforming to the
economists' simple models discussed earlier.2 Moreover,
portfolio income tends to be quite volatile; there is considerable
evidence that portfolio investments have retreated from host
countries when financial crisis strikes."' Unlike foreign di-
rect investments, where measuring the benefits to the United
States is difficult, the effect on our national welfare from port-
folio investments by individuals abroad does seem to be cap-
tured by the standard economic analysis, which takes into
account only rates of return plus domestic taxes paid.
This suggests that our national economic welfare might be
enhanced by allowing a deduction rather than a credit for
foreign taxes imposed on portfolio investments of individuals.
The foreign tax credit system was designed in a very different
era when little foreign portfolio income was earned by U.S.
citizens. Now relatively small amounts of foreign tax credits
are being claimed on increasing numbers of individual tax re-
turns.274
Generally, due to tax treaty agreements, the source-based
taxes on this income are low or zero. Much interest and capital
gains escapes source-based taxes altogether, and dividends
from treaty countries tend to be taxed at rates ranging from 5-
15%, although higher statutory rates (for example, 30% in the
United States)275 may apply in the absence of treaties. A 10%
withholding rate on dividends in U.S. treaties is common and a
rate of 5% is imposed in a number of recent treaties. 7 ' Thus,
foreign taxes on portfolio income typically are imposed at a
level comparable to the taxes of many U.S. states and are often
lower (although foreign taxes, of course, are imposed in addi-
tion to state taxes).
In the case of an individual's portfolio income, the claim to
272. See text accompanying note 99.
273. UN Report, supra note 9, at 14-16.
274. In 1997, Congress simplified the foreign tax credit for individuals with
only foreign portfolio income by eliminating the limitation if the credits claimed
are less than $300 for an individual or $600 for a married couple filing jointly.
IRC § 904(j).
275. IRC §§ 871(a), 881(a).
276. See RIcHARD L. DOERNBERG & KEES VAN RAAD, U.S. TAX TREATIES (1999).
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tax the income by the residence country predominates. Not
only does the residence country's claim seem stronger, but
taxation by the country of residence is the only way to impose
a progressive income tax based on an individual's ability to
pay. In the case of portfolio investment by individuals, consid-
erations of fairness are paramount. Lower taxes on foreign
portfolio investments than for domestic portfolio investments of
individuals violate both vertical and horizontal equity norms.
There seems to be no good reason to tax individuals who are
diversifying their risks by investing abroad more favorably
than individuals who invest domestically. Moreover,
individuals' portfolio investments abroad do not seem to pro-
duce any significant political or economic advantages to the
United States. Although further analysis is necessary to evalu-
ate the effects on national well-being of such a change, we
should explore the possibility and consequences of allowing
only a deduction for foreign taxes on such portfolio income. A
deduction system would be simpler than the credit system, and
might well increase our national welfareY Because our trea-
ties commit us to allowing credits for foreign taxes, such a
change should not be taken unilaterally, certainly not by Con-
gress overriding current treaty obligations. The potential dam-
age to our standing and relationships in the international
community from proceeding in that manner would likely out-
weigh any potential gains.
In evaluating this idea, we must consider the potential
effects on inbound portfolio investment if our shift from a cred-
it to a deduction were replicated by other nations. In addition,
since a credit would continue to be available for foreign taxes
on income from portfolio investments by foreign corporations,
anti-abuse rules to police the boundary would be required,
rules that might offset the potential simplification advantages
of such a change. Finally, consideration of such a substantial
change in the taxation of portfolio income of individuals re-
quires a fresh look at the taxation of mutual funds (which
sometimes currently already fail to obtain foreign tax credit
277. See text accompanying notes 48-51 for a discussion of national neutrality.
Certain other countries allow only a deduction for foreign taxes on portfolio in-
come, Belgium, for example. See WORKING PARTY No. 2 OF THE COMM. ON FISCAL
AFFAIRS, OECD, TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT. MUTUAL
FUNDS AND POsSIBLE TAX DISTORTIONS, at 38 (1999).
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benefits for their investors) and of other financial intermedi-
aries through which individuals invest abroad, a reexamina-
tion that is now* essential in any event."8 -If the United
States were to seriously consider allowing only a deduction for
foreign income taxes on individuals' portfolio investments, the
ultimate effect might be to stimulate a worldwide reduction, or
perhaps even elimination, of withholding taxes on dividends.
This would be a positive change, so long as the enforcement
issues discussed earlier are adequately addressed through
improved information reporting. In any event, as I have previ-
ously discussed, the important problems of enforcement of
residence-based taxes on portfolio income demands significant-
ly enhanced information reporting on a multilateral basis."9
D. Earned Foreign Source Income of Individuals
The taxation of wages earned abroad also merits reexami-
nation in light of the increasing mobility of workers. Contrary
to the practice of other nations, which typically tax only resi-
dents, the United States taxes citizens on worldwide income.
Thus, citizens of other nations working abroad for a full year
generally are not taxed on their earned income by their home
country. The United States, however, imposes tax on the
worldwide income of citizen nonresidents, allowing a foreign
tax credit for income taxes imposed by other nations. Taxing
citizens has led, in recent years, to tax-motivated expatriations
by U.S. citizens in an effort to avoid U.S. taxes on capital in-
come (and gifts and bequests), conduct that Congress acted to
stop.28
0
Currently the Code provides special benefits for foreign
earned income, exempting approximately $78,000 of wages
earned abroad and allowing a tax credit for foreign income
taxes on wages above that amount.281 The Code also provides
a special housing allowance for U.S. citizens working abroad.282
278. See generally id.
279. Reuven Avi-Yonah has proposed a 40% refundable withholding tax on port-
folio income, but he seems to agree that exchanges of information will suffice for
all but tax haven countries. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 156, at 1668-
69.
280. See IRC §§ 877, 2107, 2501(a)(3).
281. IRC §§ 901(a), 911(a)(1), (b)(2)(D), (d)(6).
282. IRC § 911(a)(2), (c).
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Although such benefits for foreign earnings are longstand-
ing, no good social or economic policy reasons have ever been
offered for those provisions. They have remained in the law at
the behest of and to benefit U.S. multinational companies.
Surely a better system for taxing wages earned abroad is possi-
ble. One alternative would be to exempt income earned in
countries with tax rates comparable to ours by a person resi-
dent abroad for the full taxable year. Keei von Raad of the
Netherlands has suggested a system for allocating the world-
wide income of nonresidents and residents who work abroad
for a substantial part of a year. He proposes that the nation of
residence (or, in the case of the United States, citizenship)
compute the individual's worldwide income based on its own
tax rules, apply its tax rate to the worldwide income and then
impose tax in proportion to the ratio of domestic income to
worldwide income.' If such an approach were used multilat-
erally, it could be used by countries of source as well as resi-
dence to impose a single level of tax on earned income. An
alternative would be to enact a simplified foreign tax credit
system for foreign earned income of individuals. In any event,
a fairer regime is surely possible.
V. CONCLUSION
The effort-which has been surprisingly successful-to
reduce international income tax policymaking to advancing
CEN or responding somehow to the insoluble conflict between
CEN and CIN is understandable, given the difficulties and
uncertainties of fashioning international tax policy taking into
account the multiple principles I have discussed here. But an
effort to take seriously into account each of the relevant norms
frees us to think anew about policy alternatives, to consider
U.S. international tax policy proposals quite differently from
the confinements of a commitment to CEN or CIN or to a com-
promise between them. Moving forward from here requires
much further analysis, empirical investigation, and discussion
(not necessarily by me), but if we are to have satisfactory inter
283. Kees van Raad, Non-Discriminatory Income Taxation of Non-Resident Tax-
payers by Member States of the European Union: A Proposal, 26 BROOK. J. INTVL
L. 1481 (2001).
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national tax policy for the years ahead, it is a task that should
begin.
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FIGURE 1
U.S. Owned Assets Abroad, Foreign-Owned Assets, and Net Position of U.S. Using Current-Cost Method
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FIGURE 2
Direct Investment Outflow, 1914-1999 (Current-Cost)
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FIGURE 3
Foreign Holdings of U.S. Long-Term Securities, 1914-1997
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FIGURE 4
U.S. Holdings of Foreign Long-Term Securities, 1960-1999
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FIGURE 5
U.S. Direct Investment Destinations, by Selected Nations, 1999
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FIGURE 6
Percentages of Total Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., By Selected Nation, 1999
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FIGURE 7
U.S. Holdings of Foreign Long-Term Securities for the Top Ten Countries of Investment and the Rest of the
World, as of December 31,1997
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FIGURE 8
Numbers of Individual Income Tax Returns With a Foreign Tax Credit or a Form 1116, by Income Bracket
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FIGURE 9
Average Foreign Tax Credits at Selected Incomes, 1996
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